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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent federal legislative and judicial actions respond to business decisions and
administrative practices transferring investment, financial, health care, and other
social welfare risk and liability to employees, retirees, and government under terms,
conditions, procedures, and requirements of employee benefit plans. The transfer of
risk and liability originates from two kinds of discretion and control over employee
benefit plans. The first source is the unilateral exercise of organizational discretion
and judgment by business managers to allocate labor, financial, and other resources
in the business management of employee benefit plans. The second source is the
rational exercise of administrative discretion and control by trustees and
administrators to manage plan assets and perform administrative practices in the
asset management and plan administration of employee welfare and pension benefit
plans. Federal legislative acts and judicial decisions respond to an organization’s
business decisions and plan’s administrative practices in deciding whether these
decisions and practices transfer too much social risk and individual liability to
employees and retirees for employee welfare and retirement security.
Organizational decisions and plan practices create and follow, respectively,
global and domestic business outcomes and social consequences of transferring risk
and liability to employees and retirees through plant closings and large layoffs,
which cause losses of retirement and welfare benefits. These decisions and practices
transfer risk and liability for employee welfare and retirement security to the
government by increasing the public cost of and participation in programs that
provide medical assistance, supplemental retirement income, food assistance, and
other social assistance. Consequently, the federal legislative and judicial branches
must scrutinize business decisions and administrative practices that transfer (or
always leave) social risk and individual liability to employees and retirees. Federal
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scrutiny takes place in light of the fact that many American business organizations
need broad, flexible organizational discretion and judgment to make American
markets, industries, and organizations more competitive in an expanding global
economy.
The individual and governmental impact of transferring risk and liability results
in increased responsibilities for employees and retirees, as well as more government
social costs and programs for health care, retirement, and other needs. If employees
and retirees cannot provide their own employee welfare and retirement security
(welfare and security) needs, then their failure to provide these needs causes
employee and retiree hardships and increases government social costs. These
hardships and costs will eventually force Congress to adjust the policy objectives and
statutory framework (objectives and framework) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 19741 (ERISA). Congress can recoup losses of employee
welfare and retirement gains, or it can forego these gains of the last forty years in
adjusting ERISA in view of less competitive American industries, markets, and
organizations hobbled by much social risk and individual liability. Federal
legislative and judicial decisions amend and interpret, respectively, ERISA’s
objectives and framework. An amendment or interpretation decides whether ERISA
should protect welfare and security interests or should forebear by transferring more
social risk and personal liability to employees and retirees. Ascertaining when
ERISA should protect or forego protecting welfare and security interests is not so
straightforward. The Federal Judiciary and Congress must recognize the substantive
issues and public policy challenges, respectively, threatening to undermine ERISA’s
objectives and framework. Specifically, federal judges and policy-makers must
continuously scrutinize business outcomes and social consequences that underlie
disputes and public policy concerns showing the transfer of more social risk and
personal liability to employees, retirees, and government. Federal scrutiny reviews
both when and how business management and plan administration of American
business organizations and employee benefit plans use social risk and liability in
responding to unfavorable business outcomes that are reasonably attributable to
global business competition.
These august federal institutions determine whether business outcomes and social
consequences that follow too closely on the heels of global and domestic conditions
and events2 may cause the transfer of enough risk and liability to undermine

1

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and I.R.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)).
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 and scattered sections of I.R.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)), was amended by the
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and I.R.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). For a review of pertinent
sections of ERISA and the Pension Protection Act (PPA), see infra Parts III and IV,
respectively.
2

See Evolution of an Economic Crisis?: The Subprime Lending Disaster and the Threat to
the Broader Economy: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. 1-3 (2008)
[hereinafter Subprime Lending Disaster] (opening statement of Senator Charles E. Schumer,
Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, describing the impact of American business
transactions, namely the Subprime Crisis, on domestic and international economic conditions).
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ERISA’s objectives and framework.3 In a perplexing triple nexus of ERISA policy,
ERISA’s framework creates welfare and security rights for employees and retirees
(individuals), confers trust or administrative discretion to entities (fiduciaries)
managing these rights, and preserves common law organizational discretion of
voluntarily subservient employers providing benefits. Federal legislative and
judicial decision-makers must consider two issues in managing ERISA’s triple
nexus. First, they must consider whether ERISA obligations and rights of employees
and fiduciaries can continuously further ERISA’s objectives and framework to
protect employees and retirees of the domestic economy. Second, they must
consider whether business organizations retain so much organizational discretion that
they are unnecessarily transferring too much risk and liability to employees, retirees,
and government in trying to compete and revitalize American standing in the global
economy. These issues create challenging public policy and legislative choices
between two classic antagonists—government regulation and private business. Now,
both must win, or the people will lose!
This Article examines why federal legislative policy-makers and judicial
decision-makers should ascertain the impact of the transfer of risk and liability on
furthering welfare and security interests and preserving organizational discretion
under ERISA and public policy. Part I explains why business organizations or
employers transfer risk and liability to employees and retirees. This transfer occurs
where global business outcomes cause social consequences that are driven directly
by business decisions responding to new global competition and less American
economic standing.4 Part II explains the need to assess the substantive issues and
3

Id.

4

See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 175-91 (1st ed. 2005). Mr. Friedman states that “[i]t is this triple convergence—of
new players, on a new paying field, developing new processes and habits for horizontal
collaboration—that I believe is the most important force shaping global economics and
politics in the early twenty-first century.” Id. at 181-82.
Commentators have forecasted economic standing and competitiveness of American
industries, markets, and organizations in 2025 and thereafter. Their assessments and forecasts
should be addressed by Western public policy-makers. See., e.g., Mathew J. Burrows &
Jennifer Harris, Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis, THE WASH.
Q., Apr. 2009, at 27 (relying on the National Intelligence Council’s 2025 forecast of the
economic order of the world); Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical
Setback for the West, CURRENT, Mar./Apr. 2009, at 11 (stating that the global financial crisis
will force the United States to operate from a smaller platform and will give China an
opportunity to rise faster); Moin Siddiqi, Dawn of a New Economic Order, AFR. BUS., Apr.
2006, at 48 (relying on the Goldman Sachs’ forecast in Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to
2050, which suggests that Brazil, Russia, India, and China (referred to as the BRICs) may
challenge, if not overtake, the major economic powers of today’s global economy).
Other commentators see the economic crisis of 2008 as a threat to globalization. See Jean
Pisani-Ferry & Indhira Santos, Reshaping the Global Economy, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 2009, at 8.
Pisani-Ferry and Santos state that:
Even before this crisis, globalization was already being challenged. Despite
exceptionally favorable global economic conditions, not everyone bought into the
benefits of global free trade and movement of capital and jobs. Although economists,
corporations, and some politicians were supportive, critics argued that globalization
favored capital rather than labor and the wealthy rather than the poor.
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public policy concerns underlying legislative acts and judicial interpretations limiting
or permitting the transfer of risk and liability by employers. Part II also explains the
need to consider the impact of the global business environment on domestic business
outcomes causing or leading to social consequences, such as less health care or
retirement funds, transferring risk and liability to employees, and retirees.5 Part III
discusses ERISA administrative and fiduciary obligations of plan sponsors,6 plan
administrators,7 and trustees;8 and it explains the ERISA rights and claims of plan
participants9 and beneficiaries.10 Part IV examines recent federal legislation

Now the crisis and the national responses to it have started to reshape the global
economy and shift the balance between the political and economic forces at play in the
process of globalization. The drivers of the recent globalization wave—open markets,
the global supply chain, globally integrated companies, and private ownership—are
being undermined, and the spirit of protectionism has reemerged. And once-footloose
global companies are returning to their national roots.
Id.
5

See generally, Subprime Lending Disaster, supra note 2 (recognizing global and
domestic impacts and implications of the looming financial crisis).
6

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052-1054 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1082 (repealed 2005) (ERISA §§
202-204, 301-302) (establishing funding and vesting and other participation requirements); see
infra Part III.A and accompanying notes. In addition, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B) (ERISA §
3(16)(B)), states that:
The term “plan sponsor” means (i) the employer in the case of an employee benefit
plan established or maintained by a single employer, (ii) the employee organization in
the case of a plan established or maintained by an employee organization, or (iii) in the
case of a plan established or maintained by two or more employers or jointly by one or
more employers and one or more employee organizations, the association, committee,
joint board of trustees, or other similar group of representatives of the parties who
establish or maintain the plan.
7

See 29 U.S.C. § 1101-1109 (ERISA §§ 401-409) (establishing and listing fiduciary
duties, breaches and liabilities); see infra Part III.C and accompanying notes. Moreover, 29
U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (ERISA § 3(16)(A)) states that:
The term “administrator” means—
(i)

the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which
the plan is operated;

(ii)

if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or

(iii)

in the case of a plan for which an administrator is not designated and a plan
sponsor cannot be identified, such other person as the Secretary may by
regulation prescribe.

8

See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (ERISA § 403(A)) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees.”);
see also infra Part III.C and accompanying notes (discussing the duties and liabilities of the
trustee as a fiduciary in asset management of plan assets).
9
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (ERISA § 3(7)) (“The term ‘participant’ means any employee or
former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee
organization . . . .”).
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adjusting ERISA’s framework by changing substantive requirements and
administrative standards for asset management and plan administration of employee
benefit plans in furthering security and welfare interests, preserving organizational
discretion and enlarging administrative discretionary authority. Part V analyzes a
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to illustrate the substantive
impact of ERISA’s interpretation on the transfer of risk and liability, namely
investment risk and financial liability, by a plan administrator executing an
investment decision of a plan beneficiary or participant. Part VI explains the
substantive and policy impacts and implications of recent legislative and judicial
decisions that permit and limit the transfer of risk and liability by plan sponsors and
administrators. Finally, Part VII finds that policy-makers and business decisionmakers must come to grips with the fact that new global competition may accelerate
the occurrence of unfavorable business outcomes, which, in turn, cause more social
welfare consequences including fewer pension and welfare benefits. Therefore,
fewer employee benefits create a need for both Congress to scrutinize ERISA and
public policy concerns, and for the Federal Judiciary to scrutinize substantive ERISA
issues in deciding whether the transfer of risk and liability to employees, retirees, and
governments greatly undermines, and therefore, justifies the immediate need to
adjust ERISA’s objectives and framework in light of domestic and global business
and social conditions.
Notwithstanding recent ERISA amendments, it is not too early to consider
whether Congress should adjust ERISA’s objectives and framework to address the
transfer of risk and liability caused by unfavorable outcomes and consequences, such
as plant closings and employee benefit plan terminations. Many outcomes and
consequences demand the vigilance and prudence of federal policy-makers in
making new policy and regulation to further welfare and security interests and
preserve organizational discretion and judgment. These outcomes and consequences
transfer risk and liability; but the threat to ERISA’s objectives and framework now
occurs in domestic industries, markets, and organizations that need to respond to
global business competition, as well as economic and political events. Moreover,
global competition may act as a catalyst that would accelerate the competitive effects
of a lethargic mixture of global technology, labor, and talent on domestic industries,
markets, or organizations. It would also hasten the decline of support by employers
for domestic social policies, such as welfare and security interests. This competition
may cause more frequent employee layoffs, plant closings, organizational failures,
and other business outcomes, which would create business instability. In fact, new
or catalytic competition challenges Western geopolitical dominance and disrupts
Western industries and markets, such as textiles and automobiles. Simply, some
American business organizations may not be competitive and face an uphill battle to
overcome less American economic standing caused by a recent global economic
crisis. This lack of competitiveness, and perhaps less standing, cause plant closings,
layoffs, and other business outcomes and will eventually lead to unfavorable social
consequences. Business organizations or employers respond to these outcomes and

10
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (ERISA § 3(8)) (“The term ‘beneficiary’ means a person
designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may
become entitled to a benefit thereunder.”).
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create consequences by transferring risk and liability to employees, retirees, and
government through the termination or modification of employee benefit plans.
II. NEED, CAUSE, AND MEANS TO ADJUST ERISA TO A TRANSFER OF RISK
ERISA is exposed to the competition of global business and its impact on the
needs of social welfare. This competition is an indifferent economic catalyst that
mimics how the addition of a catalytic agent to a chemical mixture increases the
speed of a slow or lethargic chemical reaction. Competition creates an active
mixture of digital technology, bright global talent, and less costly labor in some
foreign countries. It causes an accelerating cascade of declining markets, industries,
and business organizations that are unfavorable business outcomes with downward
effects on levels of health care, pension, and other benefits.11 Oddly, ERISA must
also preserve the organizational discretion of employers or business organizations
that need to meet or exceed this new competition and its business outcomes. Such
outcomes now include domestic plant closings, worker layoffs, foreign off-shoring
of production facilities, and outsourcing of jobs.12
A. Continuous Need to Adjust ERISA’s Objectives and Framework
Congress enacted the Pension Protection Act of 200613 (PPA) to amend and
further ERISA’s objectives and framework by addressing the impact of business
outcomes and social consequences that had been cumulating for approximately three
decades.14 In fact, ERISA still faces more business outcomes that could eventually
lead to social consequences that transfer more risk and liability to employees,
retirees, and government for retirement, health care, and other needs. In 2007, the
world faced an American-induced economic slowdown that weakened American
economic standing in the global economy.15 This weaker standing coupled with
global competition could lead to more unfavorable business outcomes.16
Consequently, the PPA and a recent Supreme Court decision recognize the
widespread use of riskier defined-contribution plans,17 and show that an ERISA

11

See Altman, supra note 4, at 11; see Siddiqi, supra note 4, at 48.

12

See Friedman, supra note 4, at 103-27.

13
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. & I.R.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)).
14

Id.

15

See Subprime Lending Disaster, supra note 2, at 1-2.

16

See id. (recognizing the economic impact of the subprime crisis on the domestic and
global economy); Burrows & Harris, supra note 4, at 27; Altman, supra note 4, at 11; Siddiqi,
supra note 4, at 48; but see Pisani-Ferry & Santos, supra note 4, at 12.
17
See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008). In LaRue, the
Court responds to the transfer of risk and liability plan procedures and requirements. For an
explanation of the implications and impact of LaRue on adjusting ERISA to address the
transfer of risk and liability through administrative procedures and requirements, see infra Part
VI and accompanying notes.
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policy is needed to closely scrutinize the impact and social consequences of these
outcomes on the states.18 These business outcomes and social consequences will be
accelerated by global business competition and, perhaps, by less American economic
standing.19 These outcomes eventually lead to the provision of fewer employee plan
benefits20 but are driven by new global competition.21 The social consequences of
plant closings and other outcomes transfer risk and liability to employees, retirees,
and government when plan sponsors terminate and modify employee welfare and
pension benefit plans.
B. Changes to Industries, Markets, and Organizations Causing the Transfer of Risk
In the past, employers provided a vast number of employee welfare needs and
supported many government policies for employee welfare, retirement security, and
other social interests.22 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, as employers

Equally important, the Court interprets ERISA based on the proliferation of definedcontribution plans and their impact on retirement security when these plans are compared to
the purposes and numbers of defined-benefit plans in existence at the enactment of ERISA.
See infra Part V and accompanying notes.
18

See infra Part VI.C and accompanying notes.

19

Protecting the Pensions of Working Americans: Lessons from the Enron Debacle,
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab., and Pensions, 107th Cong. 26 (2002)
[hereinafter Protecting the Pensions] (recognizing that Congress enacted ERISA to protect
pension plans and pension benefits approximately thirty-four years ago and that today many
employers are switching to defined-contribution plans that have less stringent ERISA
obligations than defined-benefit plans).
The retirement security of today’s employees and retirees may be no better than the wants
and hopes of at-will employees prior to the enactment of ERISA. Today’s employees cannot
fully rely on employers to perform obligations of retirement and welfare benefit plans. See
Daniel Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income—The Ideal, the Possible, and the
Reality, 11 ELDER L.J. 37, 42-43, 61 (2003) (recognizing that employers may prefer definedcontribution pension or retirement plans that permit them to retain discretion over
contributions and transfer more risk and liability to employees). Although ERISA provides
retirement security and supports employee welfare, an employer’s decision to create employee
benefit plans is a unilateral, terminable business decision.
20

See Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 3.

21

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 225-36 (finding that American companies are facing
stiffer competition in the global economy but must compete by not relying on protectionist
ideas and regulation); id. at 237-49 (discussing how American companies and individuals can
respond to the global economy).
22

See David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1601,
1601-02 (1996). The late Professor Charny recognized the transition that America was about
to undergo when he stated that:
Throughout the postwar period, large-firm employers have provided a majority of fulltime workers with a fairly comprehensive set of welfare or social insurance
entitlements. Employee social insurance has come in two varieties. First, firms have
provided certain types of insurance directly, or contracted with private third parties to
do so, and have bought or directly administered health insurance, pensions,
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face stiffer global competition and uncertain American economic standing, they
appear less able to support employee welfare and retirement security needs. Many
employers are relying on government health care, retirement assistance, and other
social programs to provide assistance or aid to workers and employees.23 However,
some employees are relying on ERISA’s objectives and framework to retain
meaningful employee welfare and pension benefits.24 Employees should not expect
much.
Federal policy-makers preserve organizational discretion25 by not mandating
these benefits under ERISA’s framework.26 Business organizations can respond
unilaterally to business outcomes and ignore the social consequences for employees
and retirees.27 In some instances, business organizations can establish nontraditional
or contingent work relationships to increase organizational discretion (actually

unemployment insurance (in the form of severance pay, and job security and income
guarantees), disability insurance, and life insurance.
Id. at 1601. However, catalytic global competition threatens to move America quickly beyond
the initial transition and force federal policy-makers and private managers to reconsider the
relationship between social welfare needs and organizational discretion more often. See
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and I.R.C.). Perhaps the PPA was only one episode in
addressing the eventual transfer of more employee welfare and retirement security needs to the
employees and retirees.
23

See Charny, supra note 22, at 1601-02.

24

See, e.g., Paul J. Donahue, Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of Options in
Participant-Directed Defined Contribution Plans and the Choice Between Stable Value and
Money Market, 39 AKRON L. REV. 9, 12 (2006) (examining the fiduciary duty of plan sponsors
of individual account plans where employers can choose investment options for the definedcontribution plans but employees can choose one or more of these options and assume the
investment risk for their investment decisions); Kimberly Lynn Weiss, Note, Directors’
Liability for Corporate Mismanagement of 401(K) Plans: Achieving the Goals of ERISA in
Effectuating Retirement Security, 38 IND. L. REV. 817, 818 (2005) (recognizing the liability of
directors of corporations where the corporation establishes and manages the assets of the
401(k) plan); John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through Asset Protection: The Evolution of
Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 163-65 (2004) (recognizing the
need to protect and grow plan assets in furthering retirement security).
25

See James E. Holloway, The Practical Entry and Utility of a Legal-Managerial
Framework Without the Economic Analysis of Law, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 131, 151 n.21
(2002) (“Hambrick and Finkelstein define managerial discretion as the ‘latitude of managerial
action.’ ‘Managerial action is domains that executives operate in . . . .’ Most importantly,
these domains include ‘resource allocation and administrative choices (e.g., reward systems
and structure) and staffing.’”) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Donald C.
Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, Managerial Discretion: A Bridge Between Polar Views of
Organizational Outcomes, in 9 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 369 (L. L. Cummings & Barry M. Straw
eds., 1987))).
26

See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).

27

See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 103-13 (using outsourcing that transfers less
essential jobs and positions to foreign countries to compete in the global economy); id. at 11427 (using off-shoring that transfers production and service facilities to foreign countries to
gain access to low-cost labor and create new markets to compete in the global economy).
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flexibility), which thereafter transfers risk and liability to contract workers and
employment organizations for welfare and security interests.28 ERISA faces both
faster occurring domestic business outcomes and mounting social consequences,
which are both driven by global economic competition and a weaker American
economic standing.29 More competition and less standing are likely to send more
challenging business outcomes rippling through American markets, industries, and
organizations.30 These outcomes lead to the transfer of more risk and liability to
employees, retirees, and governments when these organizations curtail employee
benefit plans.31

28

See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees:
Employment Law for Workers without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 251-53 (2006) (examining the impact of atypical
employment relationships on retirement security and employee welfare and recognizing the
ineffectiveness of federal employment law); Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of
Workplace Regulation: A Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 1
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 154 (2003) (finding contingent work as a means to increase
competitiveness in the global marketplace); James E. Holloway, A Primer on Employment
Policy for Contingent Work: Less Employment Regulation Through Fewer EmployerEmployee Relations, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 27 (1994) (examining the contingent work
relationship as an atypical employment relationship under federal employment law and
policy).
29

See Subprime Lending Disaster, supra note 2, at 1-2 (opening statement of Senator
Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, illustrating the impact of
American business transactions, namely the Subprime Crisis, on domestic and international
economic policies). Senator Schumer states that:
We’ve seen it most clearly in the financial markets. This summer’s credit
crunch was in large measure attributable to the collapse of the U.S. subprime market.
It shook Wall Street and required the emergency intervention of central banks
throughout the world to restore liquidity to international credit markets.
The news outside the financial markets, while not so stark, has been little better.
We all saw the anemic August jobs report—for the first time in four years, the
economy actually lost jobs. Consumer spending—the engine behind much of our
recent economic growth—has begun to slow down. Most economists have lowered
their already weak expectations about GDP growth even further. For the first time in
years, the “R word”—recession—is being discussed far and wide as a real possibility.
Id. at 2.
30

See Subprime Lending Disaster, supra note 2, at 1-3 (recognizing that the financial
crisis may have a national and international economic impact); see FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at
225-36 (recognizing that American companies are facing stiffer competition in the global
economy).
31

Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 2. At a Congressional hearing in 2002,
Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, explained the social risks and individual liabilities facing American workers who
depend on private retirement plans by identifying the “lessons [learned] from the Enron
debacle so that we can strengthen America’s pension system and protect America’s workers.”
Id. at 1. Moreover, Senator Kennedy illustrated the impact of poor business management on
retirement security and the need for ERISA in the American retirement system when he stated
that:
Sadly, Enron is not just an isolated tale of corporate greed. Instead, the Enron
debacle reveals a crisis of corporate values. In America, people who work hard all
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C. Case Law and Legislation Illustrating the Impact of Adjusting to New Risks
ERISA’s objectives and framework justify the scrutiny of unilateral and fiduciary
plan decisions that transfer social risk and personal liability through managerial and
administrative conduct of plan sponsors and administrators, respectively.32 LaRue v.

their lives deserve retirement security in their golden years. It is wrong—dead
wrong—to expect Americans to face poverty in retirement after decades of working
and saving. Enron has shown us that workers today do not have true retirement
security.
....
Enron is not an isolated example. The retirement security of workers at many
other major corporations has been similarly undermined. . . .
A generation ago, Congress took action to safeguard pensions in response to an
Enron-like debacle at Studebaker. These protections for defined benefit plans included
diversification requirements and Government insurance. As many companies have
abandoned the traditional defined benefit pension plans, 401(k) plans have become the
bedrock of America’s pension system. Today 401(k)’s [sic] offer few if any of these
safeguards for workers’ retirement security; 401(k) plans are not professionally
managed, they are exempt from diversification standards, and they are not backed by
insurance.
Id. at 1-2. See also infra Part III.A (listing the policy objectives of ERISA set forth by
Congress).
32

See ERISA, The Foundation of Employee Health Coverage: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the
Workforce, 107th Cong. 2-3 (2001) [hereinafter Foundation of Health Care] (opening
statement by Representative Sam Johnson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Employer-Employee
Relations). Representative Sam Johnson explained the impact of ERISA on health care in
investigating “the role of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA, and how
employers voluntarily improve and provide health insurance to millions of the nation’s
workers under ERISA.” Id. at 2. Representative Johnson illustrated the impact of ERISA on
the American health care coverage when he stated that:
Thanks to ERISA, the largest number of Americans, 129 million Americans,
receives health insurance through their employer. I anticipate additional hearings in
the coming months to examine such important topics as: 1) increasing the number of
insured, especially employees of small businesses; 2) the effects of claims regulations
released by the Department of Labor, as well as other regulatory burdens on employerprovided health plans; 3) ensuring medical privacy; and 4) granting greater protection
to workers enrolled in managed care plans.
Over the past 26 years the ERISA preemption of state law has played a key role
in providing health insurance to millions of Americans. ERISA covers nearly 80
percent of all workers in this nation. ERISA allows employers and employees alike to
agree on a vast array of benefits without significant government interference driving
up the cost of health insurance.
Of the estimated 43 million Americans without health insurance, 60 percent are
small business owners and their families as well as their employees and their families.
Affordable and accessible health insurance for small business enterprises is a priority
for this Subcommittee.
When you run a small operation it is absolutely critical that employees and their
families are healthy. People perform better when they have peace of mind, knowing
their loved ones are healthy, safe and protected.
Id. at 2-3.
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DeWolff, Boberg & Associates,33 illustrates the need to scrutinize plan
administrators’ decisions, which are protected by plan discretion, in view of
ERISA’s framework, which purposely minimizes the transfer of financial risk and
liability during the performance of regulated plan administration and asset
management.34 LaRue interprets ERISA’s fiduciary standards and statutory claims
where a plan administrator would have transferred investment risk, market
uncertainty, and financial liability by using administrative practices governing the
execution of a participant’s directed investment decision of an individual account.35
Next, the PPA illustrates adjustments to ERISA’s objectives and framework as a
result of new welfare and security needs to maintain the employee retirement and
welfare gains of past decades.36 The loss of these gains would transfer risk and
liability and continue the decline of defined-benefit plans, provision of fewer welfare
benefits, and use of risk-shifting defined-contribution plans.37 The PPA is employeebenefit legislation, and it responds, in part, to business outcomes that result partially
from global competition.38 This competition creates the need for American business
organizations to be more competitive or more responsive to technology, talent, and
33

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).

34

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025; see infra Part V.C and accompanying notes (explaining
that Section 502(a)(2) protects plan participants of defined-contribution pension plans
containing individual accounts).
35
See infra Part V and accompanying notes (analyzing LaRue and its legal impact and
policy implications for the adaptability and sustainability of ERISA’s policy objectives and
statutory framework).
36
See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (discussing how PPA increases access to
increase retirement security and employee welfare of employee benefit plans).
37
See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)-(c). The pertinent provisions state:
(b) Protection of interstate commerce and beneficiaries by requiring disclosure and
reporting, setting standards of conduct, etc., for fiduciaries. It is hereby declared to be
the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and
reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with
respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.

(c) Protection of interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and beneficiaries by
vesting of accrued benefits, setting minimum standards of funding, requiring
termination insurance. It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this Act to
protect interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants
in private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character
and the soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of
employees with significant periods of service, to meet minimum standards of funding,
and by requiring plan termination insurance.
Id.
38

Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C. and 29 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). The
Preamble of the PPA is extremely general but states, “An Act [t]o provide economic security
for all Americans, and for other purposes.” Id.
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labor that influences global competitiveness.39 Consequently, the PPA preserves
organizational discretion, which can be used by employers or plan sponsors to
manage employee benefit plans and exercise economic power to meet and exceed
new competition in the global economy.
LaRue and the PPA illustrate how Congress and Federal courts adjust ERISA’s
framework by responding to a single incident and the mounting effects, respectively,
of transferring risk and liability to employees, retirees, and state and federal
governments. LaRue and the PPA collectively allow ERISA’s framework to protect
benefits promised to employees, urge employers to sponsor plans, govern fiduciaries
conducting plan administration, and regulate trustees performing asset
management.40 LaRue and the PPA also allow ERISA’s framework to preserve the
organizational discretion and judgment that is needed to compete in the global
economy that is most unlike the world of 1974.41 Finally, LaRue and the PPA
illustrate the potential for great discord among the competing interests and
conflicting claims of ERISA’s framework.42
III. NATURE OF ERISA OBLIGATIONS, BREACHES, AND LIABILITIES
ERISA’s framework mandates employee benefit plans and fiduciary obligations
and identifies fiduciary and other liabilities for breaches of duty in creating,
administering, and managing employee benefit plans and their assets.43 This
framework also creates plan and statutory duties and rights, and it provides
substantive claims and remedies for plan participants and beneficiaries.44 ERISA
grants more protection to pension and retirement benefit plans than welfare benefit
plans.45 For plan sponsors, it preserves much organizational discretion in the
business management and plan administration of employee welfare benefits.46
ERISA grants less protection to retirement benefits of defined-contribution plans by
not requiring plan sponsors to fund these plans and allowing plan sponsors to make

39

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 71-80 (discussing the use of digital and other
technologies to collaborate and the use of new talent in other parts of the world).
40

See infra Part III and accompanying notes (explaining that ERISA imposes obligations
on plan sponsors and fiduciaries as well as providing rights and claims for plan participants
and beneficiaries).
41

See infra Part VI.C and accompanying notes.

42

See infra Part VI.B & C and accompanying notes.

43
See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 203, 88 Stat. 829, 854 (1974) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006 & Supp. II 2009)) (establishing minimum vesting requirements for
employee pension plans); see ERISA § 302, 88 Stat. at 869 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1082 (2006 & Supp. II 2009)) (establishing minimum funding standards for employee
pension plans).
44

See ERISA § 502, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)).

45

See ERISA § 301, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1)).

46

See id.
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discretionary contributions.47 ERISA preserves some organizational discretion in
creating or establishing defined-contribution plans,48 such as 401(k) plans.49 ERISA
permits the transfer of some investment risk and financial liability to plan
participants who accept this risk and liability when they make investment decisions
for funds in their individual accounts of defined-contribution plans.50
A. Fiduciary and Administrative Duties but Preserving Organizational Discretion
ERISA is a comprehensive statute containing administrative, fiduciary, and
enforcement provisions.51 ERISA does not mandate employee welfare and pension
benefits.52 It exercises no control over the substantive contents of employee benefit
plans.53 It mandates guidelines for the creation and administration of employee
benefit plans,54 such as requiring plans to be in writing.55 Foremost, ERISA imposes
fiduciary obligations on plan administrators, trust managers, and plan sponsors.56
Section 40157 contains coverage and exceptions to fiduciary obligations, breaches of
these obligations, and liabilities for breaching these obligations.58 Section 40259
includes obligations of plan fiduciaries and plan sponsors, such as requiring these
plans to be in writing and to list plan fiduciaries. 60 Section 402 imposes obligations
on plan sponsors and administrators to govern the operation and administration of
employee benefit plans.61 The Section lists the requisite features of employee benefit
plans.62 Next, Section 402 requires a “procedure for establishing and carrying out a
47

See Pension Protection Act §§ 101-07, 111-16, 201-06, 211-14, 221, 301-03, 901-06
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1081 (a)(7)-(8), (a)(10)) (imposing new vesting, funding
and other requirements on defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans).
48

See id. (exempting some plans from ERISA’s funding requirements). ERISA permits
employers to create special or nonqualified plans for executives and exempt these plans from
funding requirements. See Pension Protection Act § 201(c)(1) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 1081(a)(3)).
49

I.R.C. § 401(k) (amending Pension Protection Act § 827).

50

See ERISA § 404(c)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104).

51

Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 517-16 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993)).
52

See ERISA § 2 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006 & Supp. II 2009)).

53

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 732.

54

ERISA § 401 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1101).

55

ERISA § 402(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)).

56

ERISA § 401 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1101).

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

ERISA § 402(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)).

60

Id.

61

Id. § 402(b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)).

62

Id.
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funding policy and method consistent with the objectives of the plan . . .”63 and
“procedure under the plan for the allocation of responsibilities for the operation and
administration of the plan . . . .”64 Other features of Section 402 include a
“procedure for amending such plan, and for identifying the persons who have
authority to amend the plan . . . .”65 Section 402 obligates plan sponsors to design
and implement employee benefit plans and includes functional features for plan
administration and asset management by plan sponsors, administrators, and
trustees.66
ERISA also regulates asset management and plan administration by imposing
fiduciary standards and creating ERISA functions of asset management and plan
administration, but permitting plan sponsors to be a plan fiduciary in some
capacities.67 Section 3(21)’s68 definition of a fiduciary is consistent with ERISA’s
objectives and framework of not mandating employee benefit plans but regulating
plan creation, administration, and asset management. Section 3(21)(A)(i) states that,
“a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent [that] he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan
or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its
assets . . . .”69 The Supreme Court has concluded that ERISA’s definition of
fiduciary “str[ikes] a balance that [Congress] believed would protect plan
participants without impinging on the ability of employers to make business
decisions.”70 “ERISA allows trustee-beneficiary arrangements that the common law
of trusts generally forbids . . . .”71 Consequently, “Congress ‘defined “fiduciary” not
in terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over
the plan.’”72 ERISA’s definition of fiduciary preserves organizational discretion and
furthers retirement security interests by not imposing restrictive mandates on the

63

Id. § 402(b)(1).

64

Id. § 402(b)(2).

65

Id. § 402(b)(3).

66

Id. § 402(a), (b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a), (b)); see supra notes 5965 and accompanying text.
67

ERISA § 402(c) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)).

68

Id. § 3(21)(A) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)).

69

Id. § 3(21)(A)(i) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i)). A person may
also be considered a fiduciary to the extent that:
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan. Such term includes any person
designated under section 405(c)(1)(B) [29 USCS § 1105(c)(1)(B)].
Id. § 3(21)(A)(ii)-(iii) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii), (iii)) (alteration in
original).
70

Varity, 516 U.S. at 527.

71

Id.

72

Id. (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993)).
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management of business assets, except in the funding of defined-benefit pension
plans.
The extent of ERISA’s fiduciary duties that are imposed on plan sponsors and
fiduciaries in their control and authority over plan administration and asset
management was examined in Varity v. Howe.73
[A] person “is a fiduciary with respect to a plan” only “to the extent” that
“he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.”74 This definition of fiduciary “is designed,
in part, so that an employer that administers its own plan is not a fiduciary
to the plan for all purposes and at all times . . . .”75
Thus, the plan sponsor that is not exercising discretionary authority or control has no
fiduciary obligations under Section 404.76 This limit on the fiduciary obligations of
plan sponsors preserves organizational discretion in the management of business
assets and other matters.77
Section 403(a)78 mandates that plan assets be held in trust and under the authority
of a trustee who has authority to manage plan assets.79 Section 40480 lists fiduciary
duties of plan administrators and trustees by establishing a “prudent man” standard.81
Section 404 also includes the exclusive benefit rule by stating that “a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries . . .”82 and manage plan assets solely “(a) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries . . . .”83 Finally, Section
404 imposes the prudent man standard on plan trustees and asset managers by
requiring “the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.” 84

73

Varity, 516 U.S. 489.

74

Id. at 527 (quoting ERISA § 3(21)(A)(iii) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
1002(21)(A)(iii))).
75

Id. at 527-28.

76

Id. at 528.

77

See id. at 527-28.

78

ERISA § 403(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)) (“Except as provided in
subsection (b) [of this section], all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by
one or more trustees.”).
79

Id.

80

Id. § 404(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)).

81

Id.

82

Id. § 404(a)(1) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)).

83

Id. § 404(a)(1)(A)(i) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)).

84

Id. § 404(a)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). Section 404
imposes other prudent person standards by requiring trustees and other fiduciaries to exercise
reasonable or prudent care:

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/6

16

2009]

A PRIMER ON THE NEED TO CONTINUE MONITORING

829

B. Section 502(a) Claims for Breaches of Plan and Administrative Obligations
ERISA establishes liability for a breach of a fiduciary duty under unique claims
and remedies. Section 40985 lists the liabilities of a fiduciary for a breach of a
fiduciary duty.86 Section 409 states that “[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties
imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good
to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach . . . .”87 However,
Section 409 contains no enforcement actions.88 ERISA provides statutory claims to
challenge and recover for breaches of fiduciary and other duties by plan sponsors,
administrators, trustees, and others. ERISA places the enforcement of fiduciary and
other duties and recovery for breaches of these duties in Section 502.89 ERISA
establishes unique claims for civil wrongs committed by plan sponsors,
administrators, and trustees in the plan administration and asset management of
employee benefit plans.90

(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar
as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this title and
title IV.
Id. § 404(a)(1)(C), (D) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C), (D)).
85

Id. § 409(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)).

86

Id.

87

Id. As codified, Section 405, 29 U.S.C. § 1105, lists the liabilities of a co-fiduciary for
breaches of fiduciary duties. As codified, Section 405 states:
(a) Circumstances giving rise to liability. In addition to any liability which he may
have under any other provisions of this part, a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be
liable for a breach of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the
same plan in the following circumstances:
(1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or
omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 1104(a)(1) of this title in the
administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a
fiduciary, he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes
reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach.
Id. § 1105(a)(1)-(3).
88
See id. § 409 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109); but see id. § 502(a)(2)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)) (providing a civil action for a violation of §
409 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109)).
89

Id. § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132).

90

Id. The pertinent provisions of Section 502 as codified, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, reads as
follows:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be brought—
(1) by a participant or beneficiary—
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

17

830

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:813

ERISA permits plan participants and beneficiaries to file claims to protect their
rights and enforce duties under the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans.91
ERISA grants plan beneficiaries and participants statutory rights and other
protection, but these rights and protection were not available prior to ERISA under
federal regulation or state common law.92 ERISA’s statutory claims are distinct from
common law contract, trust, and other claims.93 These claims include the failure to
report and disclose information,94 establish terms to modify and terminate employee
benefits plans,95 and conform to fiduciary standards in the administration of
employee benefit plans.96 The federal courts can hear and review ERISA claims by
interpreting and applying ERISA and supplementing ERISA with federal common
law of trust, contract, employment, and corporations.97 Section 502(a)(1)(B)98

(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under
the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce
any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
Id. § 1132(a)(1)-(3).
91

See id. § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132).

92

Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001).

93

Id. § 502(a)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). Federal courts
had permitted common law contract claims in construing terms and conditions of employee
benefit plans before the enactment of ERISA. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am.,
Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 181 n.20 (1971)
(recognizing a contractual claim for unlawful termination of a retirement benefit plan).
ERISA, as codified, creates and permits only ERISA claims under Section 502(a)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), for unlawful termination and modification of employee benefit plans.
See DeGeare v. Alpha Portland Indus., 837 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom.
DeGeare v. Slattery Group, Inc., 489 U.S. 1049 (1989).
94

Id. §§ 101-111 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031).

95

Id. § 402(b)(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)). For a more detailed
analysis of the application of Section 402(b)(3) to plan modifications and terminations, see
James E. Holloway & Douglas K. Schneider, ERISA, FASB, and Benefit Plan Amendments: A
Section 402(b)(3) Violation as a Loss Contingency for a Plan Amendment, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 97
(1997); James E. Holloway, The ERISA Amendment Provision as a Disclosure Function:
Including Workable Termination Procedures in the Functional Purpose of Section 402(b)(3), 46
DRAKE L. REV. 755 (1998).
96

Id. §§ 401-414 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114).

97
See id. § 514(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). As codified, Section
514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), is the ERISA preemption provision. The Court has concluded
that Section 514(a) requires the federal judiciary to develop a federal common law of trusts,
contracts, and other fields to supplement ERISA. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 56 (1987). The Court has given the ERISA preemption provision a broad interpretation.
See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981). Section 514(a), as
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enforces the rights of a plan participant or beneficiary “under the terms of his plan .
. . to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”99 Section
502(a)(1)(B) permits only ERISA plan-based claims to enforce obligations owed by
the plan, but it requires the plan participant or beneficiary to comply with the
administrative and procedural requirements of the plan.100 Plan participants and
beneficiaries can file claims for an unlawful denial, termination, or modification of
plan pension and welfare benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B)101 of ERISA.102
C. Section 502(a) Claims for Breaches of Fiduciary Obligations Under Section 1109
Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3)103 enforce the fiduciary duties of Section 404
and establish liabilities under Section 409 and other ERISA sections that protect
employee benefit plans, plan participants, and beneficiaries. Section 502(a)(2)
empowers plan participants, beneficiaries, and others to bring claims by stating that
“[a] civil action may be brought . . . by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary
or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 [Section 409] of this title.”104

codified, states that ERISA provisions “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The
Court has concluded that a broad interpretation of Section 514 establishes uniform and
consistent federal employee benefit regulation. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 732.
Consequently, ERISA preempts state health care, taxation, employment, and other policies,
and states can do little to mandate employer-sponsored health care and other benefits. Id.
98

ERISA § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).

99

Id.

100

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1027 (2008) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
101

ERISA § 502(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).

102

See DeGreare v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 837 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated and
remanded, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
103

ERISA § 502(a)(2)-(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(3)).

104

Id. § 1132(a)(2). The ERISA enforcement scheme permits the Department of Labor to
impose civil penalties on fiduciaries. Id. § 1132(l). The pertinent provision of Section 502(l),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(l), reads:
(l) Civil penalties on violations by fiduciaries
(1) In the case of—
(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other violation of) part 4
of this subtitle by a fiduciary, or
(B) any knowing participation in such a breach or violation by any other
person,
The Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary or other person in an
amount equal to 20 percent of the applicable recovery amount.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “applicable recovery amount” means
any amount which is recovered from a fiduciary or other person with respect to a
breach or violation described in paragraph (1)—
(A) pursuant to any settlement agreement with the Secretary, or
(B) ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other person to a plan or
its participants and beneficiaries in a judicial proceeding instituted by the Secretary
under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(5) of this section.
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In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,105 the Court concluded that a
plan participant in an employee disability plan that paid a fixed level of benefits
could not bring a Section 502(a)(2) claim to recover consequential damages caused
by a delay in the processing of a disability claim.106 As discussed below, LaRue
raised a similar issue: whether Section 502(a)(2) “authorizes a participant in a
defined-contribution pension plan to sue a fiduciary whose alleged misconduct
impaired the value of plan assets in the participant’s individual account.”107 Unlike
Russell, LaRue provides a Section 502(a)(2) claim and equitable relief for individual
account plans.108 An individual account plan does not pay a fixed or defined benefit,
and the asset management by a plan participant of an individual account is somewhat
similar to plan asset management by a trustee of a defined-benefit pension plan.109 A
decade after Russell and before LaRue, Varity concluded that Section 502(a)(2)
provided only equitable relief and not compensatory or consequential damages.110
Section 502(a)(3) grants plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries the right
to bring claims under ERISA by “enjoin[ing] any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan or . . . obtain[ing] other
appropriate equitable relief . . . to redress such violations or . . . to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan. . . .”111 In Varity, the Court
made findings and conclusions of law on the interpretation and application of
ERISA’s fiduciary standards.112 Section 502(a)(3) permits beneficiaries to seek
remedial relief.113 Moreover, Section 409 is not a limitation on Section 502(a)(3),
though it operates as a limitation on Section 502(a)(2).114 Section 502(a)(3) includes

(3) The Secretary may, in the Secretary’s sole discretion, waive or reduce the
penalty under paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines in writing that—
(A) the fiduciary or other person acted reasonably and in good faith, or
(B) it is reasonable to expect that the fiduciary or other person will not be able
to restore all losses to the plan (or to provide the relief ordered pursuant to subsection
(a)(9) of this section) without severe financial hardship unless such waiver or
reduction is granted.
(4) The penalty imposed on a fiduciary or other person under this subsection with
respect to any transaction shall be reduced by the amount of any penalty or tax
imposed on such fiduciary or other person with respect to such transaction under
subsection (i) of this section and section 4975 of title 26.
Id. § 1132(l).
105

Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).

106

Id. at 148.

107

LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1022.

108

Id.

109

Id. at 1025.

110

Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 506, 507 (1996).

111

ERISA § 502(a)(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)).

112

See Varity, 516 U.S. at 507.

113

See id. at 515 (relying on ERISA’s remedial scheme for providing equitable relief).

114

See id. at 507.
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a limitation that restricts or limits the remedy or recovery for personal and plan
financial losses to equitable relief.115 Moreover, an insurance company cannot
recover damages for personal liability requested as a form of restitution where such
an equitable remedy was merely a recovery of an earlier payment of money.116
Likewise, a plan participant has no legal remedy against a nonfiduciary that
knowingly participated in a breach of a fiduciary duty that caused the employee
benefit plan to suffer financial losses.117 Thus, Section 502(a)(3) claims are limited
to equitable relief for liabilities caused by acts and practices in violation of ERISA or
plan terms.
The Court has noted that Section 502(a)(1)(B)118 claims are for a wrongful denial
of employee welfare and pension benefits under plan terms, but these claims may be
confused with Section 502(a)(2) claims for practices and acts alleging a breach of a
fiduciary duty.119 In LaRue, the petitioner, “LaRue, did not rely on § 502(a)(1)(B) as
a source of relief, and the courts below had no occasion to address the argument,
raised by an amicus in this Court, that the availability of relief under § 502(a)(1)(B)
precludes LaRue’s fiduciary breach claim.”120 The Court did not address the
preclusion of the Section 502(a)(2) claim, but sought to briefly clarify the distinction
between claims under Section 502(a) and the consequences of confusing Section
502(a) claims.121 The Court acknowledged, but left unresolved, the issue regarding
the most appropriate claim for a violation of fiduciary duty under Section 502(a) that
threatens to undermine employee benefit plans and ERISA procedural safeguards
developed under Section 502(a)(1)(B).122 Thus, procedural safeguards imposed by
115
See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (holding that
an insurance company could not recover a legal remedy when it attempted to recover
restitution for benefits it had conferred on a beneficiary); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S.
248 (1993) (holding that a plan participant could not recover money damages against a
nonfiduciary where this participant had suffered losses as a result of the nonfiduciary’s
participation in a breach of a fiduciary duty).
116

Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220-21.

117

Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262-63.

118

ERISA § 502(a)(1)(b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).

119

See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1026-27 (2008)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring).
120
Id. at 1027 (citing Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008),
at 13-30).
121

Id. at 1028.

122

Id. at 1027. Chief Justice Roberts stated in a concurring opinion that:
The significance of the distinction between a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim and one
under § 502(a)(2) is not merely a matter of picking the right provision to cite in the
complaint. Allowing a § 502(a)(1)(B) action to be recast as one under § 502(a)(2)
might permit plaintiffs to circumvent safeguards for plan administrators that have
developed under § 502(a)(1)(B). Among these safeguards is the requirement,
recognized by almost all the Courts of Appeals, see Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 162 F.3d 410, 418 n.4 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing cases), that a participant exhaust the
administrative remedies mandated by ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133, before filing
suit under § 502(a)(1)(B). Equally significant, this Court has held that ERISA plans
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ERISA and precedents, and those permitted by plans should not be exposed to an
unnecessary review but could be exposed where confusion exists in choosing
between a Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim or Section 502(a)(2) claim.123
The Court noted that such exposure and confusion would undermine the plan
authority of the plan administrators, who can invoke procedural safeguards and
standards of review under Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims challenging the
implementation and interpretation of plan terms and conditions of employee benefit
plans.124 Ultimately, the Court must determine whether administrative acts and
practices protected by plan terms or plan discretion permit plan sponsors,
administrators, or trustees to transfer too much risk and liability to employees and
retirees under ERISA’s framework. However, the PPA is Congress’s response to
business outcomes and social consequences of plan sponsors’ decisions and plan
administrators’ and trustees’ practices in the administration and asset management of
employee benefit plans.125 These social consequences of transferred health,
financial, and other types of risk and liability to employees and retirees for employee
welfare and retirement security needs, such as medical care and retirement
planning.126
IV. PENSION PROTECTION ACT AND ITS IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS
Employers exercise organizational discretion to decide the amount and kind of
liability and risk to transfer, such as offering fewer welfare benefits and transferring
asset management to plan participants.127 On one hand, employers are establishing

may grant administrators and fiduciaries discretion in determining benefit eligibility
and the meaning of plan terms, decisions that courts may review only for an abuse of
discretion. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
Id.
123

Id.

124

Id.

125

See The Retirement Security Crisis: The Administration’s Proposal for Pension Reform
and Its Implications for Workers and Taxpayers: Hearing before the Comm. on Education and
the Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (Mar. 2, 2005)
[hereinafter Retirement Security Crisis] (Opening Statement of Honorable John A. Boehner,
Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce, describing the nature of the retirement
security crisis). Representative Boehner recognizes the impact of global competition and
domestic business conditions on retirement security by stating that:
We’re entering a new kind of economy, with new kinds of products, services,
industries, and business models, and to succeed in this knowledge-and-innovationdriven economy, we need to be able to invest, and we can’t do that if outdated pension
rules make it impossible for employers to adequately budget for their pension costs
from year to year.
Retirement Security Crisis, supra at 2. Representative Boehner also recognizes that retirement
security consists of “Social Security, private pensions, and 401K savings plans,” id. at 4, and
that these public and private retirement plans are under scrutiny by Congress for different
reasons. Id.
126

See Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 3; see Foundation of Health Care,
supra note 32, at 3.
127

See supra Part II.C and accompanying notes.
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fewer defined-benefit pension plans128 and no longer provide guarantees of a specific
amount of income at retirement.129 They are establishing a greater number of
defined-contribution pension plans,130 such as profit-sharing plans,131 for new and old
employees.132 On the other hand, plan sponsors or employers are granting fewer
healthcare, dental, and other welfare benefits133 of employment and retirement.134
The PPA is a legislative response to this impact of business outcomes and their

128

See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (“The term ‘defined benefit plan’ means a pension plan
other than an individual account plan; except that a pension plan which is not an individual
account plan and which provides a benefit derived from employer contributions which is
based partly on the balance of the separate account of a participant.”).
129
See Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 2. At this congressional hearing,
Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions in the United States Senate, stated, “As many companies have abandoned the
traditional defined benefit pension plans, 401(k) plans have become the bedrock of America’s
pension system.” Id.
130

See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (“The term ‘individual account plan’ or ‘defined
contribution plan’ means a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each
participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant’s
account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other
participants which may be allocated to such participant’s account.”).
131

See I.R.C. § 401(k).

132

See Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 3. In the hearing on protecting pension
benefits, Senator Kennedy also identified the personal risks accompanying the reliance on
401(k) plans. Id. at 2. In fact, he stated that “[t]oday 401(k)’s offer few if any of these
safeguards for workers’ retirement security; 401(k) plans are not professionally managed, they
are exempt from diversification standards, and they are not backed by insurance.” Id.
133

See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). Section 1002(1) states:
(1) The terms “employee welfare benefit plan” and “welfare plan” mean any plan,
fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan,
fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A)
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services. . . .
Id.
134

See Foundation of Health Care, supra note 32, at 2 (opening statement of
Representative Sam Johnson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations,
Committee on Education and the Workforce). At this congressional hearing, Representative
Johnson stated:
I look forward to the witness discussion of the role of ERISA in providing health
coverage to our 129 million workers. The Subcommittee must be responsive to
shortcomings in the health care system, but we must also insist on workable solutions
that do not erode coverage or make cost unaffordable.
We need to expand access to more affordable health insurance and reduce the
number of uninsured.
Id. at 3.
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social consequences on ERISA and its employee welfare and retirement security
policy.135 Thus, a review of the purposes, rights, and duties of a few PPA
amendments shows how Congress responds to business outcomes and social
consequences threatening to undermine ERISA’s objectives and framework.136
A. Providing Retirement Security, Information, and Financial Advice
The PPA imposes new disclosure, fiduciary, and administrative obligations on
plan administrators, plan sponsors, and asset managers of employee welfare and
pension benefit plans.137 To illustrate, Section 501 amends ERISA and provides
more financial security and stability under Section 101(f)138 of ERISA by adding
plan funding requirements to minimize underfunding and plan termination of
defined-benefit pension plans.139 Section 501 also provides notice and disclosure
requirements that require plan participants and beneficiaries to receive funding
notices and other information from multiemployer plans140 and single-employer
plans.141 Similarly, Section 502(c)142 amends Section 204(h)(1)143 of ERISA by
requiring multiemployer plans to notify employers of plan amendments that
significantly reduce future benefit accruals.144 Other disclosure requirements include
Section 506,145 which amends Section 4041146 of ERISA by establishing disclosure
requirements for single-employer plans on the termination of pension plans.147
Likewise, Section 508148 amends Section 105(a)149 by requiring plan administrators
of individual account plans and defined-benefit plans to provide pension benefit
135

See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (listing and explaining newly created ERISA
rights that were granted to plan participants and beneficiaries to maintain employee gains in
employee welfare and retirement security and recognizing that plan sponsors are offering
defined-contribution pension plans transferring investment risk and financial liability for
retirement planning and health care needs to employees).
136

See id.

137

Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, tit. V, §§ 501-02, 506, 508, 120
Stat. 780, 935-52 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and I.R.C. (2006 &
Supp. II 2009)).
138

Id. § 101(f) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f)(2)(B)(i)(I)).

139

See id. § 501(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f)).

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id. § 502(c) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f)).

143

ERISA § 4041 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C § 1054(h)(1)).

144

Pension Protection Act § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f)).

145

Id. § 506 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)).

146

ERISA § 4041 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1341).

147

Pension Protection Act § 506 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)).

148

Id. § 508 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)).

149

ERISA § 105 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1025).
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statements to plan participants or beneficiaries on a regular or specific schedule.150
The PPA recognizes the uncertainty, risk, and liability of retirement planning when
plan participants make financial investment and other decisions with inaccurate,
incomplete, or untimely information.151
The PPA provides more access to investment advice by plan participants, more
discretionary authority to plan administrators, and more organizational discretion to
plan sponsors. The PPA amends ERISA’s exempted transactions provision that
directly affects plan administration and asset management of individual account
plans,152 such as 401(k). ERISA’s exempted transactions provision prohibits plan
sponsors and administrators from providing investment advice and collecting a fee
from plan participants and beneficiaries for such advice.153 Yet, many plan
participants who rely primarily on defined-contribution plans need investment advice
and education on consumption, retirement, and estate planning. Thus, Section 601154
of the PPA amends Section 408155 of ERISA by adding a statutory exemption to the
prohibited transactions provision.156 Section 601 of the PPA permits fiduciaries to
provide investment advice to plan participants and beneficiaries of individual
account plans, such as the 401(k) plan, under eligible investment advice
arrangements.157 The Section 601 exemption for financial advisers allows

150

Pension Protection Act § 508 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)).

151

Id. §§ 501-02, 506, 508 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and
I.R.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)); see supra notes 155-177 and accompanying text (explaining
ERISA disclosure, fiduciary, and administrative obligations imposed by the Pension
Protection Act).
152
Id. §§ 601, 611-612, 621-625 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4975 and 29 U.S.C. §§
1002, 1104, 1108, 1112, 1141).
153

See ERISA § 408 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)).

154

Pension Protection Act § 601(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)).

155

ERISA § 408 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108).

156

Pension Protection Act § 601(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)).

157

Id. Section 601 amends 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b), Exempted Transactions, by adding a new
exemption that provides retirement planning advice to plan participants but raises some
financial service, legal, and public policy concerns. See Jon O. Shimabukuro, Investment
Advice and the Pension Protection Act of 2006, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, Mar. 11, 2008, at
CRS-1 (stating that the CRS Report “provides background information on investment advice
and fiduciary responsibilities imposed by ERISA” and examines provisions of the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 that amend ERISA to establish new rules dealing with the provision of
investment advice to plan participants by qualified investment advisers.).
On January 21, 2009, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued final regulations on the
implementation of Congress’s statutory exemption, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14), and its class
exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1), at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408g-1 to g-2 (2009).
Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 74 Fed. Reg. 3822 (Wednesday, Jan. 21,
2009) [hereinafter Investment Advice I] (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). DOL provides
an overview of the comments and its responses to these comments on implementing the final
regulations of eligible investment advice arrangement. Investment Advice I, supra at 382246.
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fiduciaries to charge and receive a counseling fee from plan beneficiaries for the
receipt of investment advice to aid in the financial management of both participants’
and sponsors’ contributions to individual account plans.158 This investment advice
must be given by fiduciary advisers who are governed by fiduciary obligations and
liability of ERISA’s framework.159 Moreover, the PPA contains other exemptions
for prohibited transactions involving asset management by plan fiduciaries. Section
611160 amends Section 408 of ERISA and Section 4975161 of the Internal Revenue

On March 20, 2009, the DOL delayed implementation of 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408g-1 to g-2
(2009), until May 22, 2009. Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 74 Fed. Reg.
11847 (Friday, Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Investment Advice II] (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 2550). The DOL delayed implementation for sixty days in response to considerations of
the Obama Administration and concerns regarding statutory interpretations of some
commenters to proposed and final regulations. Investment Advice II, supra at 11847-48. On
May 22, 2009, the DOL delayed implementation of 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408g-1 to g-2, until
November 22, 2009. Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 74 Fed. Reg. 23952
(Friday, May 22, 2009) [hereinafter Investment Advice III] (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
2550). DOL states that “[t]he Department believes that the complexity and significance of the
issues involved justify delaying the effective and applicability dates of the final rule for an
additional 180 days in order to afford the Department time for further review.” Investment
Advice III, supra at 23952.
158

Pension Protection Act § 601(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)); 29
C.F.R § 2550.408g-1.
159

Pension Protection Act § 601(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)); 29
C.F.R § 2550.408g-1; see also infra Part III.A-B and accompanying notes (discussing the
duties and liabilities of fiduciaries, such as plan administrators and trustees, under ERISA’s
framework).
160

Pension Protection Act § 611 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4975(d) and 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002(42), 1108(b), 1121(a)). Section 611 creates exemptions from ERISA prohibited
transaction rules for financial and other investment transactions that involve service providers,
I.R.C. § 4975(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b), foreign exchange transactions and cross trading, 29
U.S.C. § 1108(b), block trading, 29 U.S.C. § 1112(a), and bond relief and purchase and sale of
a security between a plan and party in interest using an electronic communication network,
I.R.C. § 4975(d)(19) and 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b). Moreover, Section 611(f) also amends Section
102(42) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(42), by defining plan assets:
(42) the term “plan assets” means plan assets as defined by such regulations as the
Secretary may prescribe, except that under such regulations the assets of any entity
shall not be treated as plan assets if, immediately after the most recent acquisition of
any equity interest in the entity, less than 25 percent of the total value of each class of
equity interest in the entity is held by benefit plan investors. For purposes of
determinations pursuant to this paragraph, the value of any equity interest held by a
person (other than such a benefit plan investor) who has discretionary authority or
control with respect to the assets of the entity or any person who provides investment
advice for a fee (direct or indirect) with respect to such assets, or any affiliate of such a
person, shall be disregarded for purposes of calculating the 25 percent threshold. An
entity shall be considered to hold plan assets only to the extent of the percentage of the
equity interest held by benefit plan investors. For purposes of this paragraph, the term
“benefit plan investor” means an employee benefit plan subject to part 4, any plan to
which section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 applies, and any entity
whose underlying assets include plan assets by reason of a plan’s investment in such
entity.
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Code (IRC) to create exemptions for prohibited financial investment transactions,
such as block trading, bonding relief and electronic communication networks.162
Finally, Section 612163 amends Section 408 to create an exemption that permits a
fiduciary or party-in-interest to correct some otherwise but unknown prohibited
transaction if the fiduciary, party-in-interest, or another party corrects the prohibited
transaction within fourteen days after having discovered the prohibited transaction,
or after one could have reasonably discovered it.164
The PPA also grants administrative discretion to fiduciaries performing plan
administration and asset management for particular investment decisions and
transactions that are likely to expose these fiduciaries and plan sponsors to
investment risk and financial liability. The PPA amends ERISA to permit fiduciaries
to invest assets in the individual accounts of plan participants who cannot, for one
reason or another, manage these assets of their individual accounts.165 Section 621166
amends Section 404167 of ERISA by limiting the fiduciary liability of plan
administrators and other fiduciaries when the ability of participants or beneficiaries
to direct investments has been suspended.168 Next, Section 624169 also amends
Section 404 by permitting fiduciaries to give notice to plan participants and then
“exercis[e] control over the assets in the account with respect to the amount of
contributions and earnings which, in the absence of an investment election by the
participant, are invested by the plan in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Secretary.”170 Section 624 limits the fiduciary liability of plan administrators by
permitting a default investment transaction for plan participants in individual account
plans, such as 401(k).171 Finally, Section 625172 amends Section 404 of ERISA to
permit the annuity contract to be an optional form for the distribution of assets by

29 U.S.C. § 1002(42) (citation omitted). This definition of plan assets limits the classification
of an entity’s assets as plan assets if an employee benefit plan does not hold twenty-five
percent or more of the value of this entity’s equity assets. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(42).
161

ERISA § 408 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108 and I.R.C. 4975).

162

Pension Protection Act § 611 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108 and I.R.C. §

4975).
163

Id. § 612 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b) and I.R.C. § 4975(d)).

164

Id. § 612(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)).

165

Id. § 621 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)); id. § 624 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)).
166

Id. § 621 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)).

167

ERISA § 404 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104).

168

Pension Protection Act § 621(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)).

169

Id. § 624 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)).

170

Id.

171

Id.

172

Id. § 625 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104).
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plan beneficiaries of individual account plans. 173 The use of this annuity contract for
such a purpose is not subject to the safest available annuity standard,174 but it is
subject to all other fiduciary standards.175 The PPA expands fiduciary discretion and
control by limiting a fiduciary’s exposure to investment risk, market uncertainty, and
financial liability. This adjustment limits the ability of plan participants and
beneficiaries to challenge low investment returns and financial losses of individual
account funds of authorized investment or market transactions.176
The PPA recognizes the need for individual investment advice for retirement
planning. Eventually, the PPA may reduce some investment risk and financial
liability of defined-contribution plans, but it permits the transfer of risk and liability
to plan participants in what appears to be a zero-sum game. The PPA preserves
organizational discretion of plan creation and extends plan discretion of plan
administration and asset management by limiting the risk and liability of plan
administrators, sponsors, and trustees for some investment transactions and
practices.177
B. Enhancing Employees’ Asset Management, Ownership, and Participation
The PPA expands the regulation of asset management and plan administration of
individual account plans to provide investment opportunities for asset managers and
plan participants.178 The PPA also preserves and limits organizational and
administrative discretion of some asset management and administrative practices to
improve retirement security.179 First, Section 901 amends Section 401(a)180 of the
IRC. Section 901 increases investment diversification of employers securities held
by plan participants in their individual accounts of defined-contribution pension
plans.181 Section 901 mandates that trustees and plan administrators provide plan
participants an opportunity to divest employer securities allocated as contributions
and an opportunity to reinvest funds of those securities in at least three other
investment options that possess materially different risk and return characteristics
173

Id.

174

See 29 C.F.R § 2509.95-1 (2008). Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 is entitled “Interpretive
bulletin relating to the fiduciary standards under ERISA when selecting an annuity provider
for a defined benefit pension plan.” Id. The purpose of Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 is to
“provide[] guidance concerning certain fiduciary standards . . . applicable to the selection of
an annuity provider for the purpose of benefit distributions from a defined benefit pension plan
(hereafter ‘pension plan’) when the pension plan intends to transfer liability for benefits to an
annuity provider.” Id. § 2509.95-1(a).
175

Pension Protection Act § 625(a)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104).

176

See id. § 621 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)); id. § 624 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)).
177

See, e.g., id. § 621 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)); id. § 624 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)); see supra Part IV.A and accompanying notes.
178

See Pension Protection Act § 901(a)(1) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(a)(35)).

179

See id.

180

Id. § 901(a)(1) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(a)(35)).

181

Pension Protection Act § 901(a)(1) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(a)(35)).
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from employer’s securities.182 Second, Section 902 amends Section 401(k)183 of the
IRC by permitting plan sponsors to create “qualified automatic contribution
arrangement[s]” that enroll eligible employees who have not elected to participate in
cash or deferred compensation plans when plan sponsors are making qualified
contributions until employees decide to elect to participate.184 Third, Section 903
amends Section 414185 of the IRC by establishing benefit, contribution, and notice
requirements for the administration of eligible combined defined-benefit plans and
qualified cash or deferred arrangements by treating each plan as if it were not a part
of a combined plan.186 Obviously, Section 901 limits the transfer of risk and liability
by requiring asset diversification; and Section 902 benevolently transfers risk and
liability by permitting the enrollment of a plan participant in a defined-contribution
plan when this participant would not otherwise receive contributions from his or her
employer.
The PPA increases the retirement security of younger employees who are forced
to rely solely on defined-contribution plans for retirement savings. Simply, it
imposes faster vesting of employers’ contributions to employees’ individual plan
accounts.187 Foremost, the PPA amends ERISA and IRC to provide faster vesting for
defined-contribution plans. Section 904(b)188 amends Section 203(a)(2)189 of ERISA,
and Section 904(a)190 amends Section 411(a)(2) of the IRC. ERISA and the Internal
Revenue Code contain identical vesting schedules that include faster vesting for
employers’ contributions to defined-contribution plans.191 In focusing only on
ERISA’s vesting schedules, Section 904(b) amends Section 203(a)(2) of ERISA by
requiring plan sponsors of defined-benefit plans to provide plan participants with one
of two vesting schedules.192 First, ERISA’s five-year cliff vesting schedule requires
employees to possess “a nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of the employee’s
accrued benefit derived from employer contributions.”193 Second, ERISA’s three- to
seven-year graded vesting schedule requires employees to possess “a nonforfeitable
right to a percentage of the employee’s accrued benefit derived from employer
contributions determined under the . . . table” within this section.194 The PPA

182

Id.

183

Id. § 902 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(k)(13)).

184

Pension Protection Act § 902(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(k)(13)).

185

Id. § 903 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 414(x)).

186

Id. § 903(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 414(x)).

187

Id. § 904(b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)).

188

Id. § 904(b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)).

189

ERISA § 203(a)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)).

190

Pension Protection Act § 904(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)).

191

Id. § 904(a)-(b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)).

192

Id. § 904(b)(2)(A)(i).

193

Id. § 904(b)(2)(A)(ii).

194

Id. § 904(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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accords 20% for the third year and 20% each year thereafter with 100% vesting by
the end of the seventh year 195
Section 904(b) amends Section 203(a)(2) of ERISA by requiring plan sponsors of
defined-contribution plans to provide plan participants with one of two vesting
schedules.196 First, ERISA’s three-year cliff vesting schedule requires an employee
to possess a “nonforfeitable right to one hundred percent of the employee’s accrued
benefit derived from employer contributions.”197 Second, ERISA’s two- to threeyear graded vesting schedule requires an employee to possess “a nonforfeitable right
to a percentage of the employee’s accrued benefit derived from employer
contributions determined under the . . . table” within this section.198 The PPA
accords 20% for the second year and 20% each year thereafter with 100% vesting by
end of the sixth year.199
In a curious twist, the PPA’s Section 904(b) graded and cliff vesting of an
employer’s or a plan sponsors’ contributions to defined-contribution plans is the
most liberal vesting or an early transfer of a nonforfeiture right to plan assets.200
Section 904(b)’s liberal cliff and graded vesting schedules also transfer investment
risk and financial liability for the management of the assets to plan participants and
beneficiaries.201 Moreover, the PPA’s liberal cliff and graded vesting schedules
reduce unallocated employer contributions.202 These schedules eliminate exercises
of organizational discretion that would have been used to reallocate the employer’s
contribution of nonvested assets.203 Plan participants who may have quit in year two
or three before full vesting are now eligible for full or partial vesting in less time.204
A restricted vesting schedule meant that more unallocated, but unvested, forfeitable
contributions would have been retained by plan sponsors and, thereafter, reallocated
to other employees as employer contributions or used by the plan sponsor for
business needs.205 Consequently, one must conclude that new competition of the
195

See id.

196

Id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(i).

197

Id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(ii).

198

Id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(iii).

199

See id.

200

See id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(iii).

201

See id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(iii).

202

See id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(iii).

203

ERISA § 102(19) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (19)). ERISA establishes
a claim that plan participants can pursue to recover vested or nonforfeitable benefits. Id.
ERISA states that:
The term “nonforfeitable” when used with respect to a pension benefit or right means a
claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or
deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant’s service,
which is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan. . . .
Id.
204

See Pension Protection Act § 904(b)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(iii).

205

See ERISA § 102(19) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (19)).
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global economy demanding more organizational discretion would likely favor
restricted vesting schedules to acquire more flexibility and control over employers’
contributions by making the vesting period much longer.206
C. Increasing Access to Early Retirement and Availability of Welfare Benefits
The PPA gives plan sponsors and plan participants an option for providing for
employee welfare benefit needs of early retirement and pension benefit needs before
full retirement. This option avoids exposing plan participants or early retirees to
unnecessary risk and liability by accepting early retirement.207 Some employees of
private organizations may want to retire at age sixty-two and receive Social Security
payments, but they may delay retirement if they cannot afford health care insurance
on their retirement income.208 Section 905209 may be a solution to early retirement
for some early retirees. Section 905 permits plan participants to receive a retirement
distribution from their pension plan at age sixty-two but continue to work for a few
more years. Section 905 amends Section 3(2)210 of ERISA. Section 3(2) is the
definition of an employee pension benefit plan and pension plan.211 Section 905
permits a distribution of plan assets by an “employee who has attained age 62 and
who is not separated from employment at the time of such distribution.”212 Section
905 permits a distribution of plan funds or assets before the termination of covered
206

See also Halperin, supra note 19, at 58-59 (calling for the immediate vesting of the
employer’s contributions, though the employer wants to use its retirement plan as an incentive
in reducing turnover).
207

See Pension Protection Act § 905 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)).

208

See Report of the Working Group on Phased Retirement, November 14, 2000,
approved by the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Plans (Advisory
Council), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/phasedr1.htm (last visited on Nov. 10, 2009)
[hereinafter Report on Phased Retirement] (The Advisory Council was to advise the Secretary
of Labor in carrying our his or her duties under ERISA). The Report on Phased Retirement
states that:
[P]hased retirement means a gradual change in a person’s work arrangements as a
transition toward full retirement. This may involve a change of employers (including
self-employment), a change of career or a reduction in the number of hours
worked. . . .
A study by Joseph Quinn of Boston College indicates that one-third to one-half of
American workers will work on a “bridge job” along the way to total retirement.
....
Obstacles to Phased Retirement
....
Loss of benefits: Health care coverage is another concern for older workers. By
moving from full-time employment to part-time employment, an employee may lose
access to company-subsidized health care coverage.
Report on Phased Retirement, supra.
209

Pension Protection Act § 905 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)).

210

Id.

211

ERISA § 3(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)).

212

Pension Protection Act § 905 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)).
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employment (salary or income used to determine pension contributions and
income).213 There appears to be no ERISA requirement that would require plan
sponsors or employers to deny early retirees, who are still active employees, the right
to participate in employee health care and other benefit plans.
The PPA creates access to funds for employee and post-retirement health care
benefits by giving plan sponsors more organizational discretion in the use of pension
plan assets and permitting an income exclusion for plan participants in insurance
contracts of welfare benefit plans.214 Section 841 amends Section 420 of the IRC by
permitting plan sponsors of defined-benefit pension plans to transfer excess plan
assets to a qualified post-retirement welfare benefit plan that will incur future health
care liabilities.215 Section 842216 amends Section 420 of the IRC by permitting
multiemployer pension plans to transfers excess pension assets to postretirement
health benefit accounts.217 Next, the PPA permits greater use of cash assets to
support health care benefit plans under Section 843.218 It amends Section 419A of
the IRC by permitting plan sponsors of bona fide association health care plans to
create or maintain a reserve for medical benefits in qualified asset accounts.219 In
addition, Section 844 creates Section 72(e)(11) of the IRC and grants an exclusion
from gross income for particular payments to a qualified long-term care insurance
contract for any charge against the cash value of an annuity contract or the cash
surrender value of a life insurance contract.220 Section 844 requires that this contract
be a part of or a rider on this annuity or life insurance contract, but the investment in
the contract is reduced but not below zero.221 The individual receiving the exclusion
must file a return with the Secretary of the Treasury.222
The PPA adjusts ERISA’s objectives and framework to limit and permit the
transfer of risk and liability by preserving organizational discretion, extending
administrative authority and discretion, and providing opportunities for more welfare
and security gains. Part V below analyzes LaRue to illustrate how the Court
responds to the plan administration of defined-contribution plans that contain
individual account plans that permit directed investment of funds in these accounts
by plan participants under Section 404(c)(2) of ERISA.223 Specifically, the Court
must decide what administrative practices can legitimately transfer investment risk
and financial liability when plan participants rely on plan administrators to
213

Id.

214

Id. § 841(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 420(f)).

215

Id.

216

Id. § 842(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 420(a) and (e)(5)).

217

Id.

218

Id. § 843(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 419A).

219

Id.

220

Id. § 844(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 72 (e)(11)).

221

Id.

222

Id. § 844(d)(1)(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6050U).

223

See ERISA § 404(c)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C § 1104(c)(2)).
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implement directed investment decisions with little or no fiduciary liability under
Section 404(c)(1)(A)(ii).224
V. LARUE AND ERISA CLAIMS, LIABILITIES, AND RELIEF
ERISA can limit the transfer of social risk and liability by adjusting ERISA’s
objectives and framework regulating administrative practices and actions that were
created and used by plan administrators to execute directed investment decisions for
individual account assets. LaRue dealt directly with this substantive issue and
alluded to a public policy concern in ascertaining the fiduciary obligation of a plan
administrator, who allegedly breached a fiduciary duty under Section 502(a)(2) by
failing to execute the plan beneficiary’s directed investment decision for an
individual account of a defined-contribution pension plan.225 In approaching this
issue and concern from a different perspective, LaRue skirted ERISA’s objectives
and framework in briefly discussing the plan participant’s rights under plan terms
and Section 502(a)(1)(B) for a plan administrator’s failure to execute this
participant’s directed investment decision.226 Obviously, LaRue’s impact on Section
502(a) claims must be resolved to address the failure of the plan administrator to
execute a plan participant’s or beneficiary’s directed investment decisions before
there can be a full assessment of the transfer of investment risk, market uncertainty,
or financial liability under ERISA’s trust or contract laws.
A. Section 502(a) Issues in the Administration of Individual Accounts
The Federal Judiciary’s interpretation of ERISA may determine how ERISA’s
objectives and framework limit or permit the transfer of risk and liability by a plan
administrator using administrative practices and procedures to implement a directed
investment decision of a plan participant who participates in a defined-contribution
plan containing individual retirement plans. To illustrate, the petitioner, LaRue, filed
an ERISA claim against his former employer and respondent, DeWolff, Boberg &
Associates (“DeWolff”) and its 401(k) retirement savings plan.227 The respondent
administered its 401(k) retirement saving plan (“DeWolff Plan”), which was an
individual account plan. DeWolff permitted the petitioner and other plan
participants to direct or make their investments of contributions under the DeWolff
Plan’s procedures and requirements.228 In 2001 and 2002, petitioner alleged that he
directed the DeWolff Plan to make certain changes to investments in his 401(k)
retirement savings account.229 However, DeWolff never executed his directions.230
The petitioner alleged that the DeWolff Plan did not implement his investment
decision, which caused him to suffer account losses of $150,000.231 He claimed that
224

See id. § 1104(c)(1)(A)(ii).

225

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1022,1025 (2008).

226

See id. at 1024 & n.3.

227

Id. at 1022.

228

Id.

229

Id.

230

Id.

231

Id. at 1022-23.
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this failure “‘depleted’ his interest in the plan . . . [and] amounted to a breach of
fiduciary duty under [ERISA].”232 Specifically, petitioner’s complaint sought
equitable relief under Section § 502(a)(3).233 The respondent moved for summary
judgment, stating that petitioner’s claim was for monetary relief and was, therefore,
not permitted under Section 502(a)(3).234 Although petitioner argued that he was
seeking only equitable relief, the district court agreed with the respondent and
granted summary judgment because the respondent did not possess any contested or
disputed funds belonging to petitioner.235
The petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit and argued that his claims under Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) requested
only equitable relief.236 The Fourth Circuit found that petitioner’s Section 502(a)(2)
claim had not been raised in the district court. However, the court still decided the
Section 502(a)(2) claim on the merits and concluded that ERISA’s framework and
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell’s holding237 would not permit an
individual claimant to recover on an individual account within a defined-contribution
plan under Section 502(a)(2) for a breach of a fiduciary duty when the petitioner was
seeking only personal relief for monies or assets in his individual account and not the
entire plan.238 In relying on Russell, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a Section
502(a)(2) claim could only provide a remedy for the entire plan and not for an
individual.239 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit rejected petitioner’s Section 502(a)(3)
232
Id. In LaRue, the Court does not reach the merit of a breach of fiduciary duty by
respondent or the plan administrator and only “assume[s] that respondents breached fiduciary
obligations defined in § 409(a), and that those breaches had an adverse impact on the value of
the plan assets in petitioner’s individual account. Whether petitioner can prove those
allegations and whether respondents may have valid defenses to the claim are matters not
before us.” Id. at 1024. Moreover, the Court is most explicit in noting that the economic
value of a 401(k) account has no bearing on the determination of the breach of a fiduciary duty
under Section 502(a)(2). The Court states that “[a]lthough the record does not reveal the
relative size of petitioner’s account, the legal issue under § 502(a)(2) is the same whether his
account includes 1% or 99% of the total assets in the plan.” Id. Finally, the Court leaves
several unanswered questions regarding the conduct or action of plan participants or the
petitioner under the terms and conditions of the plans. The Court does not “decide whether
petitioner made the alleged investment directions in accordance with the requirements
specified by the Plan, whether he was required to exhaust remedies set forth in the Plan before
seeking relief in federal court pursuant to § 502(a)(2), or whether he asserted his rights in a
timely fashion.” Id. at 1024 n.3.
233

Id. at 1023 (citing Civil Action No. 2:04-1747-18 (D.S.C.), p. 4, 2 Record, Doc. 1).

234

Id.

235

Id.

236

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).

237

Id. at 1023.

238

Id.

239

Id. The Court notes that “[r]elying on our decision in Russell, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that § 502(a)(2) ‘provides remedies only for entire plans, not for
individuals. . . . Recovery under this subsection must “inure[ ] to the benefit of the plan as a
whole,” not to particular persons with rights under the plan.’” Id. at 1022 (citing LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 450 F.3d 570, 572-73 (4th Cir. 2006)).
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claim because he was not seeking equitable relief but, rather, a recovery of personal
losses from only his account.240 The Fourth Circuit found that the individual account
plan contained no plan assets and that the plan administrator executed the directed
investment decision of the plan participant on behalf of the plan, and it concluded
that this participant could not recover for losses from his individual account.241
The Fourth Circuit would severely limit the fiduciary obligation of and impose
little or no liability on plan administrators for administrative procedures and
requirements that are likely to enlarge a prior transfer risk and liability to a plan
participant who makes directed investment decisions that automatically transfer this
risk and liability to plan participants.242 The Fourth Circuit’s conclusion would
expand plan administrator’s discretion and control over defined-contribution plans
containing individual accounts.243 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion would
always leave transferring risk and liability with plan participants until the plan
administrator chose to execute directed investment decisions under market
uncertainty and investment risk.
B. Section 502(a)(2) Issue under Russell and Defined-Contribution Plans
The petitioner did not share the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions on ERISA’s
framework regarding who should bear the investment risk, financial liability, and
market uncertainty for a plan administrator’s failure to timely implement a directed
investment decision of a plan participant or beneficiary. Consequently, the petitioner
requested and received a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.244 The Court
agreed to decide whether Section 502(a)(2) and Russell would “authorize[] a
participant in a defined-contribution pension plan to sue a fiduciary whose alleged
misconduct impaired the value of plan assets in the participant’s individual
account.”245 The Fourth Circuit misread Russell and “[w]hile language in our Russell
opinion is consistent with that [Court of Appeals’] conclusion, the rationale for
Russell’s holding supports the opposite result in . . . [LaRue].”246 “In Russell[, the
Court] held that a participant in a disability plan that paid a fixed level of benefits
could not bring suit under § 502(a)(2) of [ERISA] . . . to recover consequential
damages arising from delay in the processing of her claim.”247 The Court had to
consider whether its past precedent, ERISA’s present framework, and today’s use of
defined-contribution plans justify allowing the plan participant to sue a fiduciary that

240

Id. at 1023.

241

Id. (citing LaRue, 450 F.3d at 572-73).

242

See supra Part V.A and accompanying notes (discussing fiduciary duties, breaches and
liability, and enforcement of fiduciary liability under ERISA’s framework).
243

See LaRue, 450 F.3d at 572-73.

244

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 551 U.S. 1130 (2007).

245

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs. Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1022 (2008).

246

Id.

247

Id.
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had caused this plan participant to suffer a financial loss from a specific, identifiable
individual account.248
The petitioner’s claim arose under Section 502(a)(2),249 which “authorizes the
Secretary of Labor as well as plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries, to bring
actions on behalf of a plan to recover for violations of the obligations defined in §
409(a).”250 “The principal statutory duties imposed on fiduciaries by . . . [S]ection
[502(a)(2)] ‘relate to the proper management, administration, and investment of fund
assets’ . . . .”251 Section 502(a)’s purpose was to “ensur[e] that ‘the benefits
authorized by the plan’ are ultimately paid to participants and beneficiaries.”252 The
misconduct of a plan administrator in failing to perform the instructions of the plan
participant “falls squarely within” Section 502(a)(2).253 Effectively, the Court

248

Id. For analysis of the merits of using Section 502(a)(2) to permit individual recovery
of legal and equitable remedies, see Regina L. Readling, Rethinking “The Plan”: Why ERISA
Section 502(a)(2) Should Allow Recovery to Individual Defined Contribution Pension Plan
Accounts, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 315 (2008). Ms. Readling states that:
In order to fully explain why ERISA has proven inadequate in providing remedies to
defined contribution plan participants harmed by fiduciary breach, an examination of
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions is
required. In sum, the net effect of the Russell, Mertens, and Great-West decisions took
away a substantial amount of protection and barred a number of potential remedies
that should have been afforded to defined contribution plan participants aggrieved by a
breach of fiduciary duty. As will be discussed in detail below, application of the
Russell precedent was used to bar recovery for breach of fiduciary duty under section
502(a)(2) if the remedy inured to an individual, or an individual account. Further,
Mertens and Great-West drastically limited even the type of equitable relief an
aggrieved participant could seek under section 502(a)(3).
Readling, supra, at 333-34.
249

LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024.

250

Id.

251

Id.

252

Id. (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985)); see also
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1996) (noting that § 409’s fiduciary obligations
“relat[e] to the plan’s financial integrity” and “reflec[t] a special congressional concern about
plan asset management”).
253

Id. Although the record before the Court did not show any lost profits suffered by the
petitioner, the Court concluded that Section 502(a)(2) was still the appropriate claim in the
management of trust assets. Id. at 1024 n.4. The Court stated that:
The record does not reveal whether the alleged $150,000 injury represents a decline in
the value of assets that DeWolff should have sold or an increase in the value of assets
that DeWolff should have purchased. Contrary to respondents’ argument, however, §
502(a)(2) encompasses appropriate claims for “lost profits.” Under the common law
of trusts, which informs our interpretation of ERISA’s fiduciary duties, trustees are
“chargeable with . . . any profit which would have accrued to the trust estate if there
had been no breach of trust,” including profits forgone because the trustee “fails to
purchase specific property which it is his duty to purchase.”
Id. (citations omitted).
In one of the concurring opinions, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy, did
not agree that petitioner, LaRue, had raised a Section 502(a)(2) claim in challenging the
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created fiduciary parity under ERISA’s framework. The administrative practices that
support investment decisions made by participants of defined-contribution pension
plans will be given the same fiduciary protections as those given to asset
management practices that support investment decisions made by trustees or other
fiduciaries of defined-benefit plans.254 This fiduciary parity does not allow plan
administrators who exercise ineffective administrative procedures and impose
requirements that implement directed investment decisions of individual accounts to
transfer all risk and liability to plan participants and beneficiaries.255
C. Section 502(a)(2) to Recover for Individual Account Impairment
ERISA does not permit the transfer of risk and liability by denying plan
participants the benefits promised by their employee benefit plans, nor does it permit
plan administrators to deny benefits that are granted by these plans.256 In LaRue, the
Court stated that a fiduciary’s misconduct “in Russell . . . fell outside this category”
in that “[t]he plaintiff in Russell received all of the benefits to which she was
contractually entitled, but sought consequential damages arising from a delay in the
processing of her claim.”257 Russell stressed that the fiduciary relationship of Section
409(a) was with the plan, and the plan itself was the victim of the breach and entitled
to recovery for such fiduciary breach.258 Next, the circumstances behind the
enactment of ERISA by Congress were the ‘“misuse and mismanagement of plan

omission of the fiduciary. Id. at 1026 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts,
however, agreed with the Court’s conclusion that ERISA permits recovery for the breach of a
fiduciary duty for failing to perform an investment transaction in a defined-contribution plan
that consists of individual account plans and permitting directed investment by a plan
participant. Id. Chief Justice Roberts stated that:
LaRue’s right to direct the investment of his contributions was a right granted and
governed by the plan. In this action, he seeks the benefits that would otherwise be due
him if, as alleged, the plan carried out his investment instruction. LaRue’s claim,
therefore, is a claim for benefits that turns on the application and interpretation of the
plan terms, specifically those governing investment options and how to exercise them.
Id. It is at least arguable that a claim of this nature properly lies only under § 502(a)(1)(B) of
ERISA. That provision allows a plan participant or beneficiary “to recover benefits due to
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). It is
difficult to imagine a more accurate description of LaRue’s claim. And, in fact, claimants
have filed suit under § 502(a)(1)(B) alleging similar benefit denials in violation of plan terms.
Id. (citing Hess v. Reg-Ellen Machine Tool Corp., 423 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2005)
(discussing an “allegation made under § 502(a)(1)(B) that a plan administrator wrongfully
denied instruction to move retirement funds from employer’s stock to a diversified investment
account”); LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1026 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (other citations omitted).
254

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024 (recognizing that particular asset management or
administrative duties are enforceable under Section 502(a)(2)).
255

See id.

256

See ERISA § 502(a)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)).

257

LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024 (citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-37).

258

Id. (citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 140).
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assets by plan administrators’” 259 and that the sum of the purpose of Section
502(a)(2) and Section 409 is to “protect the ‘financial integrity of the plan . . . .’”260
In LaRue, ERISA’s framework takes ineffective administrative practices that transfer
investment risk and financial liability to plan participants and beneficiaries of
defined-contribution pension plans that contain individual accounts managed by
these participants and beneficiaries and exposes those practices to fiduciary
liability.261
The history and nature of the defined-contribution pension plan justify a Section
502(a)(2) claim to protect individual accounts from a breach of a fiduciary duty.262
Foremost, the Court concluded that the dominant use of defined-contribution plans
would not support “Russell’s emphasis on protecting the ‘entire plan’ from fiduciary
misconduct . . . .”263 Defined-contribution pension plans are preferred by employers
in the retirement plan market.264 “In contrast, when ERISA was enacted, and when
Russell was decided, ‘the [defined-benefit] plan was the norm of American pension
practice.’”265 Next, the defined welfare benefit plan in Russell266 is unlike the
defined-contribution pension plan in LaRue. Russell’s disability plan did not contain
employees’ individual plan accounts, but rather, it paid a disability benefit based on a

259

Id. (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 141 n.8).

260

Id. (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 142 n.9).

261

Id. at 1024.

262

See id. at 1025.

263

Id. In another concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, did not
agree that the proliferation of defined contribution plans in the private sector justifies moving
away from Russell’s protection of the entire plan. Id. at 1028 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justices Thomas and Scalia, however, still agreed with the Court’s conclusion that Section
502(a)(2) applies to individual accounts of defined contribution plans. Id. Justice Thomas
also stated, “Although I agree with the majority’s holding, I write separately because my
reading of §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) is not contingent on trends in the pension plan market. Nor
does it depend on the ostensible ‘concerns’ of ERISA’s drafters.” Id.
264

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025 (citing David Rajnes, An Evolving Pension System:
Trends in Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans (Employee Benefit Research
Institute) Sept. 2002, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0902ib.pdf (last visited
Oct. 27, 2009); Facts from EBRI: Retirement Trends in the United States Over the Past
Quarter-Century (Employee Benefit Research Institute) June 2007, available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0607fact.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2009)).
265

Id. (citing JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE, & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 58 (4th ed. 2006); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined
Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471 (2004) (discussing the “significant reversal of
historic patterns under which the traditional defined benefit plan was the dominant paradigm
for the provision of retirement income”).
266

Russell, 473 U.S. at 136 (“Respondent Doris Russell, a claims examiner for petitioner
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company . . . is a beneficiary under two employee
benefit plans administered by petitioner for eligible employees. Both plans are funded from
the general assets of petitioner and both are governed by ERISA.”).
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formula that used the employee or plan participants’ compensation.”267 Russell
focused on those plans that pay a defined benefit or fixed amount and found that
misconduct by fiduciaries of these plans does not affect individual accounts that
actually do not exist.268 The characteristics of defined-benefit plans prompted
Congress to reduce the risk of default by imposing funding requirements and
requiring insurance with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to
protect against unfunded or underfunded plan termination.269 Consequently,
“[w]hether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all participants and
beneficiaries, or only to persons tied to particular individual accounts, it creates the
kind of harms that concerned the draftsmen of § 409.”270 Russell’s concerns with the
entire plan, “which accurately reflect the operation of § 409 in the defined-benefit
context, are beside the point in the defined-contribution context.”271 Finally, other
provisions of ERISA are consistent with the Court’s conclusion on asset
management of individual accounts when fiduciaries are “exempt[ed] . . . from
liability for losses caused by participants’ exercise of control over assets in their
individual accounts.”272
In LaRue, the Court held “that although § 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy
for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does authorize
recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s
individual account.”273 One concurring opinion agreed with Court’s holding but
based the Court’s interpretation of Section 502(a)(2) solely on the text of ERISA and
not the dominance of defined-contribution plans.274 The other concurring opinion of
LaRue also considered allowing LaRue, a plan participant, to file a Section
502(a)(1)(B) claim because his allegations may be no more than a denial of benefits
under the terms and conditions of the defined-contribution plan.275
LaRue can limit the transfer of risk and liability to plan participants and
beneficiaries when plan administrators used or relied on ineffective administrative
acts and practices to execute or implement directed investment decisions of
individual account plans. This limit places the risk and liability for losses of account
funds on plan administrators who create and fail to execute administrative acts and

267

LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025 (citing Russell v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482,
486 (9th Cir. 1983)).
268

Id.

269

Id. (citing Zelinsky, supra note 265, at 475-78).

270

Id.

271

Id.

272

Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2007)).

273

Id. at 1026.

274
Id. at 1028 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justices Scalia and Thomas did not agree that the
increased use of defined-contribution plans should be considered in the interpretation of
Section 502(a)(2). Id.
275
Id. at 1026 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy did
not agree that LaRue had raised a Section 502(a)(2) claim in challenging the omissions of the
fiduciary. Id.
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practices. Section 502(a)(2) permits a plan participant of a defined-contribution plan
that contains individual accounts to file an ERISA claim for breach of a fiduciary
duty by the plan administrator for failing to execute a directed investment decision.276
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF LARUE AND THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT
The implications and impact of the PPA and LaRue on maintaining employee
welfare and retirement security gains must be assessed in view of the need of plan
sponsors, plan administrators, and asset managers to transfer social risk and financial
liability in business management, plan administration, and asset management of
employee benefit plans. This transfer of risk and liability also includes considering
the implications and impact of PPA and LaRue on the need to maintain
organizational discretion and administrative control of plan sponsors and plan
administrators, respectively. LaRue signals that the use of administrative procedures
and practices can transfer risk and liability in a slightly different manner than
employment contracts and trust arrangements of the common law; but they do so
with similar retirement social welfare consequences, namely the loss of retirement
savings.277 Although the PPA addressed and imposed limits on the transfer of risk
and liability to employees and retirees, the PPA still permits fiduciaries to transfer
risk and liability by exercising administrative discretion; and it allows employers to
transfer risk and liability by exercising organizational discretion. Therefore,
Congress must come to grips with the fact that the impact of more foreign
competition and less American economic standing and competitiveness could mean
more unfavorable business outcomes and social consequences, which includes the
transfer of more risk and liability to employees, retirees, and government.
A. LaRue and Fiduciary Liability, Breaches, and Remedies
LaRue is consistent with ERISA’s objectives and framework, even though LaRue
creates a Section 502(a)(2) breach of fiduciary duty claim for impairment of
individual accounts by a plan administrator.278 LaRue does not restrict plan sponsors
who want to provide fewer employee welfare and retirement benefits.279 Plan
sponsors can continue to make discretionary contributions to defined-contribution
pension and welfare benefit plans.280 LaRue does not greatly interfere with the
administrative discretion and control of plan administrators over definedcontribution pension plans permitting directed investment decisions.281
LaRue recognizes a fundamental change in employers’ creation of pension
benefit plans, reaffirms the nature of different kinds of employee benefit plans, and

276

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1026.

277

See Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 2. “A generation ago, Congress took
action to safeguard pensions in response to an Enron-like debacle at Studebaker. These
protections for defined benefit plans included diversification requirements and Government
insurance.” Id. (statement of Senator Kennedy).
278

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26; see supra Part V. C and accompanying notes.

279

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025.

280

See id.

281

See id. at 1025-26.
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continues to deny recovery for personal injuries under ERISA’s framework.282
Foremost, a substantial change in granting pension benefits has taken place since
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974.283 “In contrast, when ERISA was enacted, and
when Russell was decided, ‘the [defined-benefit] plan was the norm of American
pension practice.’”284 Moreover, the Court distinguished the defined-benefit welfare
(disability benefit) plan in Russell285 from the defined-contribution pension
(retirement account) plan in LaRue.286 “[T]he disability plan at issue in Russell did
not have individual accounts; it paid a fixed benefit based on a percentage of the
employee’s salary.”287 Finally, the Court was consistent in its refusal to award
compensatory damages under ERISA’s objectives and framework for the
enforcement of rights of plan participants and beneficiaries under plan terms and
ERISA fiduciary obligations. LaRue is consistent with Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates288 and Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson289 on the kind
of remedy that plan participants and beneficiaries can recover under ERISA.290
LaRue permits only equitable relief.291 Although the plan participant can recover
losses of profits from individual accounts, the only recovery under Sections
502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) is equitable relief. LaRue permits recovery only for lost
profits under trust law and does not permit recovery for personal injuries under a
common law remedy.292
The impact of LaRue on the fiduciary obligations and liability of plan
administrators and plan sponsors is quite manageable under administrative
procedures and ERISA procedural safeguards.293 Plan sponsors and administrators
need only address the administrative procedures and requirements that are likely to
contain or cause disputed administrative acts and practices that would breach a

282

See id.

283

See id. at 1025.

284

LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025 (citing LANGBEIN, supra note 265, at 471 (discussing the
“significant reversal of historic patterns under which the traditional defined benefit plan was
the dominant paradigm for the provision of retirement income”).
285

Russell, 473 U.S. at 136.

286

LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025.

287

Id. (citing Russell, 722 F.2d at 486).

288

Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (holding that plan participant could
not recover money damages against a nonfiduciary where the participant alleged he had
suffered losses as a result of the nonfiduciary’s participation in a breach of a fiduciary duty).
289

Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (holding that
insurance company could not recover under a legal or at-law remedy when it attempted to
recover under restitution for benefits it had conferred on a beneficiary).
290

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025.

291

See id. at 1026.

292

See id.

293

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025; see supra Part V.C and accompanying notes.
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fiduciary duty and result in liability.294 Plan participants may not use Section
502(a)(1)(B) to challenge plan procedures or ERISA procedural safeguards because
Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims are normally about the denial of benefits and other
claims under the plan terms and conditions.295 These participants will not be
permitted under ERISA to challenge the exercise of authority and discretion by plan
administrators and trustees.296
B. Limits of LaRue in Pursuing Section 502(a) Claims
LaRue’s impact on the transfer of risk and liability is not fully known or
understood under Section 502(a) because the Court relied on factual assumptions and
left unresolved issues to address the Section 502(a)(2) claim.297 Specifically, LaRue
relies on the assumption of a breach of fiduciary duty, gives little or no weight to the
economic value of individual accounts in challenging administrative practices, and
places great weight on resolving disputes under Section 502(a)(2) claims that are
likely to avoid ERISA procedural safeguards.298 Foremost, the Court did not reach
the merits of the claim of a breach of a fiduciary duty by respondents as plan
administrators, but it “assume[d] that respondents breached fiduciary obligations
defined in § 409(a), and that those breaches had an adverse impact on the value of
the plan assets in petitioner’s individual account.”299 On this issue, the Court stated,
“Whether petitioner can prove those allegations and whether respondents may have
valid defenses to the claim are matters not before us.”300 Next, the Court was most
explicit in noting that the economic value of the 401(k) individual account has no
bearing on the issue of the determination of the breach of a fiduciary duty under
Section 502(a)(2).301 The Court stated that “[a]lthough the record does not reveal the
relative size of petitioner’s account, the legal issue under § 502(a)(2) is the same
whether his account includes 1% or 99% of the total assets in the plan.”302 What
remains is that the Federal Judiciary must scrutinize substantive issues to determine
if the transfer of risk and liability to plan participants under ERISA’s objectives and
framework is reasonable when plan sponsors and administrators who permit directed
investment decisions are allowed to transfer the investment risk and financial

294

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025.

295

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025, 1027 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). LaRue’s majority and
concurring opinions agree on the need to protect plan procedures and ERISA safeguards not
subject to scrutiny under Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims that are based primarily on plan terms.
See generally id.
296

See supra Part III.B; see also LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025, 1027 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
297

LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024.

298

Id.

299

Id.

300

Id.

301

Id.

302

Id.
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liability to plan participants and beneficiaries for these administrators’ untimely
performance of the investment transactions.303
In LaRue, the Court also leaves unsettled questions regarding the distinction
between Section 502(a)(2) and Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims.304 It firmly recognizes
the need to preserve ERISA procedural safeguards and the standard of review for
plan administrators’ decisions that are challenged by plan participants and
beneficiaries under Section 502(a)(1)(B).305 Chief Justice Roberts stated, “I do not
mean to suggest that these are settled questions. They are not. Nor are we in a
position to answer them.”306 Since the petitioner LaRue had raised only a Section
502(a)(2) claim, the Court would not decide whether a Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim
was appropriate on the facts.307 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts points
out the danger of not addressing this question, when he stated that “[a]llowing a §
502(a)(1)(B) action to be recast as one under § 502(a)(2) might permit plaintiffs to
circumvent safeguards for plan administrators that have developed under §
502(a)(1)(B).”308 Thus, a substantial fiduciary need exists to preserve and protect
ERISA and plan procedural safeguards that are relied on or used by plan
administrators to deny benefits, reimburse benefit claims, and other actions of plan
administration and asset management.
The federal courts must not review numerous Section 502(a)(2) claims for a
breach of fiduciary duties when these claims do not follow ERISA safeguards and
plan procedures as required by Section 502(a)(1)(B).309 Section 502(a)(2) should not
be a bypass around Section 502(a)(1)(B) via a trip to federal courts. Equally
important, these denials of federal review protect the deferential standard of review
applied by federal courts to scrutinize plan administrator and trustee’s decisions that
interpret plan terms.310 These denials prevent Section 502(a)(2) claims from placing
artificial substantive restrictions on the administrative authority or discretion of plan
administrators responding to requests for benefits and other actions.311 This
discretion is granted to plan administrators so that they may “determin[e] benefit
eligibility and the meaning of plan terms, decisions that courts may review only for
an abuse of discretion.”312
303

See id. at 1024-25.

304

Id. at 1027 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

305

Id.

306

Id.

307

Id. (“LaRue did not rely on § 502(a)(1)(B) as a source of relief, and the courts below
had no occasion to address the argument, raised by an amicus in this Court, that the
availability of relief under § 502(a)(1)(B) precludes LaRue’s fiduciary breach claim.” (citing
Brief for ERISA Indus. Comm. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 2007 WL
2679382, *13-30 (2007))).
308

Id.

309

See id.

310

Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).

311

See id. at 1027 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

312

Id. (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115).
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In the aftermath of LaRue, some confusion and uncertainty remain in the Federal
Judiciary’s review of Section 502(a)(2) claims that respond to a breach of fiduciary
duty for the administration of individual accounts of defined-contribution pension
plans.313 The nature and cause of fiduciary liability are not entirely clear because the
merits of the fiduciary breach of duty were never addressed by the Court. Next, an
issue regarding the selection of a Section 502(a)(2) or 502(a)(1)(B) claim to resolve
benefit claim disputes was not fully resolved by the Court in LaRue.314 Protecting
ERISA procedural safeguards and requirements play a paramount role in selecting a
Section 502(a)(2) or Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim for a breach of a fiduciary duty in
the administration of individual accounts.315 A Section 502(a) claim is less likely to
disturb the authority granted to plan administrators under ERISA procedural
safeguards, and the deferential standard of review granted to plan administrators
under employee benefit plan fits best with ERISA’s objectives and framework.316
LaRue permits a broad exercise of organizational discretion and administrative
authority by protecting the use of ERISA procedural safeguards and plan
procedures.317 This broad exercise permits the transfer of risk and liability by
permitting plan administrators to interpret plan terms, deny benefit claims or make
other plan decisions where ERISA and plan procedures and requirements must be
followed to file a claim under ERISA’s enforcement provisions.
C. Implications of LaRue and PPA for ERISA’s Enforcement
LaRue’s interpretation of Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(1)(B) fits well with the
context of ERISA’s objectives and framework.318 Yet, the PPA takes plan
participants and beneficiaries who acquire investment advice from fiduciary advisers
to manage individual account assets and exposes them to new investment risk, more
market uncertainty and greater financial liability; and the PPA will raise new
disputes under Section 502(a) regarding the integrity of some financial advice.319
The PPA protects defined-benefit pension plans, increases the stability of defined-

313

Id. at 1024 & n.3.

314

Id. at 1027 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

315

Id.

316

See id.

317

See id. at 1024.

318

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26; supra Part VI.A and accompanying notes. The
Court states that “[m]ost significant is § 404(c), which exempts fiduciaries from liability for
losses caused by participants’ exercise of control over assets in their individual accounts. See
also 29 C.F.R.§ 2550.404c-1 (2007). This provision would serve no real purpose if, as
respondents argue, fiduciaries never had any liability for losses in an individual account.” See
LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26.
319
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 601(a)(1), 120 Stat. 780, 95253 (2006) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14) (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). Section
406(b) prohibits financial and other transactions between the plan fiduciary and plan
participants under ERISA’s framework. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 406(b), 88 Stat. 829,
879 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2009)).
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contribution pension plans,320 and increases the opportunity for funding of some
health care benefits.321 At most, LaRue protects individual accounts of definedcontribution pension plans from a breach of fiduciary duty by a plan administrator
who used an inadequate administrative practice to execute a directed investment
decision.322
The PPA may increase the exposure of individual account assets to investment
risk, financial liability, and market uncertainty. This exposure may lead to more
Section 502(a) claims. Section 601323 of the PPA amends Section 408—Exempted
Transactions324 —of ERISA to permit fiduciary advisers to offer investment advice
to plan participants and beneficiaries of defined-contribution pension plans that
contain individual accounts.325
Section 408 creates an eligible investment
arrangement that permits a fiduciary adviser to provide investment advice to plan
participants and beneficiaries, but ERISA’s framework for fiduciary duties and
liability governs the decisions and practices of fiduciary advisers.326 Eventually, plan
participants and beneficiaries will use financial advice and education, but they will
suffer substantial losses of assets or funds from their individual accounts due to
unforeseen or unexpected market risk and uncertainty. Some plan participants and
320

See supra Part IV.B (discussing PPA provisions that provide access to financial
advising for plan participants in individual account plans, faster vesting, and permit
distribution for retirement while the participant is still working).
321

See supra Part IV.C (discussing PPA provisions that permit employers or plan sponsors
to transfer excess pension funds to health care plans and exclude from gross income to pay for
long-term care insurance).
322

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26.

323

See infra note 330 and accompanying text.

324

ERISA § 408(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a)).

325

See infra note 330 and accompanying text.

326

Pension Protection Act § 601(a)(1) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14));
see also supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text (discussing the eligible investment
arrangement of the PPA and its implementation by the Department of Labor). Congress and
the Department of Labor (DOL) do not want American workers managing their retirement
accounts with little or no financial investment advice and education for consumption,
retirement, and estate planning. See Investment Advice I, supra note 157, at 3822. Moreover,
the DOL must never allow fiduciary advisers who give investment and planning advice to
transfer risk and liability by financial, professional, and administrative procedures and
requirements. The hundreds of billions of dollars in defined-contribution plans and individual
retirement accounts (IRA) must lead the DOL to consider the impact of eligible investment
advice arrangements on financial markets and institutions. DOL should talk to the Department
of Treasury, Department of Commerce, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to
understand the impact of these arrangements on the American and Global financial systems.
These agencies need to examine how institutional practices, ERISA fiduciary standards, and
professional certifications could eventually impact the redistribution or reallocation of market
uncertainty, financial liability, and investment risk under an eligible investment advice
arrangement. Curiously, the DOL has found it extremely difficult to implement eligible
investment arrangements that would provide investment advice and education to plan
participants and beneficiaries under ERISA’s newly created statutory exemption from
prohibited transactions. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
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beneficiaries may make allegations of inadequate or improper financial advice. We
cannot predict the future, but it should not be surprising if, after LaRue, a few plan
participants and beneficiaries file Section 502(a) claims and pursue litigation when
they do not receive satisfactory answers or responses for losses from individual
accounts.327 LaRue indicates that newly created fiduciary advisers should avoid
using loosely structured financial counseling practices that are not responsive to the
investment needs of plan participants and beneficiaries making directed investment
decisions for individual accounts.328 ERISA claims may arise when these practices
do not provide timely information or permit timely use of advice and provide an
investment option unfamiliar to plan participants.329
Section 502(a) claims play a role in deciding whether federal courts will permit
or limit the transfer of risk and liability to employees and retirees in interpreting
statutory provisions or sections of ERISA’s framework in response to business
outcomes and social consequences, such as permanent layoffs and pension plan
327

See also LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26. The Court recognizes that a fiduciary cannot be
exempted from all liability for directed investment decisions by plan participants. See id.
328
See id. 1024-25 (“Whether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all
participants and beneficiaries, or only to persons tied to particular individual accounts, it
creates the kind of harms that concerned the draftsmen of § 409. . . .”).

329

See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text. Individual accounts of definedcontribution welfare benefit plans may be implicated by LaRue, but complete analysis is
beyond the scope of this article. LaRue points out that Russell’s defined-benefit plan actually
includes payment for a welfare benefit plan, which was a disability benefit. Conceivably,
LaRue could extend to health care, educational, and other individual benefit accounts of
defined-contribution welfare benefit plans. LaRue’s Section 502(a)(2), codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2009), would be a claim preferred by plan
participants who would allege a breach of a fiduciary duty for an inept administrative practice
that denies timely services and accurate responses to benefit claims. They would allege that
ineffective administrative practices do not permit timely actions and decisions by plan
administrators. Yet, Section 502(a)(1)(B), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(b)
(2006 & Supp. II 2009), may present a hurdle where the Court insists on protecting ERISA.
plan procedures, and plan requirements so that plan administrators can exercise discretion in
interpreting plan terms and responding to requests for benefits. However, LaRue is a Section
502(a)(2) claim, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), brought by a plan participant
on behalf of his own individual account and may not extend beyond its original facts and
circumstances. One must ask whether LaRue’s Section 502(a)(2) claim would apply to other
defined-contribution benefits that use individual accounts administered by plan administrators
solely on behalf of plan participants of defined-contribution plans. LaRue finds the type and
nature of the employee benefit plan relevant in determining whether Section 502(a)(2) applies
to a breach of a fiduciary duty for individual accounts. LaRue requires only that the benefit
plan cannot pay a fixed amount and must consist of individual accounts. Again, the presence
of confusion and uncertainty in distinguishing between Section 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(2)
claims may present a hurdle when plan participants are trying to avoid following plan and
ERISA procedural safeguards to challenge an administrator’s decision. This confusion leaves
the nature of a Section 502(a)(2) claim for the impairment of individual accounts providing
only welfare benefits difficult to resolve under Section 502(a)(2). In LaRue, the Court
assumed the breach of a fiduciary duty and focused on protecting ERISA procedural
safeguards. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025. Section 502(a)(2) claims seem most uncertain when
the dispute is decided on the merits and includes compliance with ERISA procedures and
requirements.
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modifications.330 The widespread use of individual accounts and their protection
from incomplete and untimely administrative practices creates the need to consider
the nature and utility of Section 502(a) claims.331 In particular, these claims protect
the application or request for pension and welfare benefits by plan participants and
beneficiaries under the plan’s terms and ERISA procedural safeguards.332 These
claims also guarantee the execution of investment decisions and integrity of
investment advice by plan administrators under fiduciary obligations.333 The Court
and Congress must eventually decide when a Section 502(a) claim should restrict the
discretion and control of plan administrators and when it should limit organizational
discretion and flexibility of plan sponsors, who allocate and reallocate risk and
liability of employee benefit plans.
The enforcement issues of Section 502(a) are important in determining whether
plan sponsors and administrators are transferring too much risk and liability under
ERISA’s objectives and framework. Several regulatory concerns and business risks
and opportunities make the transfer of risk and liability most inviting to plan
sponsors and administrators, who must manage business risk and liability in response
to domestic business and social needs of a global economy. These concerns include
the receipt of only equitable relief,334 judicial focus on protecting ERISA and plan
procedures,335 fiduciary standards and deference to protecting administrative
discretion,336 contract terms preserving organizational discretion,337 and a slow
legislative response to an erosion of retirement security.338 These concerns coexist
with business opportunities that demand the management and reallocation of social
risk and personal liability to employees and retirees under ERISA’s objectives and
framework.339 Once business organizations transfer too much risk and liability to the

330

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024-25. The Court recognizes that Section 502(a) protects
the financial integrity of the plan and claims for benefits under the plan. See id.
331

See id. at 1026-27 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

332

Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

333

Id. at 1024-25.

334

See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
335

See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1026-27 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). “Equally significant, this
Court has held that ERISA plans may grant administrators and fiduciaries discretion in
determining benefit eligibility and the meaning of plan terms, decisions that courts may review
only for an abuse of discretion. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Burch, 489 U.S. 101, 155
(1989).” Id. at 1027.
336

See id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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See id. at 1026-27 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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See, e.g., Protecting the Pension, supra note 19, at 1; Foundation of Health Care,
supra note 32, at 1. Congress conducted legislative hearings to investigate public policy
concerns regarding retirement security and employee welfare two to three years before the
enactment of the Pension Protection Act.
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public, this transfer becomes no more than a redistribution or externalization of
social liability and costs to government social programs.
VII. CONCLUSION
ERISA eventually may need to adjust to the transfer of social welfare risk and
liability to further its policy objectives and statutory framework. LaRue and the PPA
signal that ERISA’s framework and objectives can be adjusted to maintain employee
welfare and retirement security gains that are comparable with those of the last
quarter of the twentieth century.340 However, it remains to be seen whether ERISA
can continue to adjust to the transfer of risk and liability occurring more frequently
in a more competitive and dominating global economy. If American employers do
not broadly meet global competition or improve economic standing, they will face
new business outcomes, creating undesirable social consequence.341 Thereafter, they
will transfer more risk and liability to employees, retirees, and government.
Business decision-makers and public policy-makers must come to grips with the
fact that catalytic competition can transform foreign labor, technology, and talent
into a more competitive mixture in the presence of global capital. In addition, less
American economic standing may create another hurdle for business markets,
industries, and organizations.342 This competition and standing may cause more
unfavorable business outcomes and social consequences that are capable of eroding
the protection gained by employees and retirees under ERISA’s objectives and
framework. This erosion of employee welfare and retirement security gains may
take place even faster when stiffer competition and poor standing increase the
frequency and kinds of unfavorable business outcomes.343 Corporate policy-makers
and business decision-makers must respond to global competition and may need to
overcome a lower economic standing to avoid or minimize unfavorable business
outcomes and social consequences, thus minimizing the transfer of risk and
liability.344
If American markets, industries, and organizations cannot meet this competition
and improve their standing in the global economy, Congress and the Federal
Judiciary will be faced with the task of reexamining ERISA’s objectives and
framework. Congress can choose to do nothing, or it can provide more employee
welfare and retirement security in response to a transfer of too much risk and
liability. In accomplishing the latter, Congress would need to adjust ERISA’s
framework to increase access to employee welfare and retirement benefits. Congress
has several legislative options. It can provide tax incentives and financial subsidies
to encourage employers to provide more employment, postemployment, and
postretirement benefits. Congress can also assist in rebuilding or retooling American
340
See supra Part VI and accompanying notes (discussing the impact and implications of
LaRue and the PPA on transferring social risk and liability).
341

See id.
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See Altman, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that the global financial crisis will force the
United States to operate from a smaller platform); Siddiqi, supra note 4, at 48 (forecasting
stiffer business competition for the U.S. and other western nations in the global economy).
343

Retirement Security Crisis, supra note 125, at 2.
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industries, finding new markets, and improving business management to increase
competitiveness and economic standing. While Congress is considering what to do,
the Federal Judiciary will eventually be asked to decide when retirees, employees,
and the government must accept the denial, termination, or modification of health
care, retirement, and other benefit plans under ERISA’s framework. Eventually,
federal policy-makers must decide who will bear the burden of unfavorable business
outcomes and social consequences, such as plant closings and plan terminations,
which cause the reallocation of social welfare risk and liability in view of more
foreign (catalytic) competition and less American economic standing of the global
economy.345

345

See Retirement Security Crisis, supra note 125, at 2.
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